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Abstract
This dissertation examines various philosophical issues associated with the
physics of phase transitions. In particular, i) I analyze the extent to which
classical phase transitions impose a challenge for reductionism, ii) I evaluate
the widespread idea that an infinite idealization is essential to give an account
of these phenomena, and iii) I discuss the possibility of using the physics of
phase transitions to offer a reductive explanation of cooperative behavior in
economics.
Against prominent claims to the contrary, I defend the view that phase
transitions do not undermine reductionism and that they are in fact compat-
ible with the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics. I argue
that this conclusion follows even in the case of continuous phase transitions,
where there are two infinite limits involved.
My second claim is that the infinite idealizations involved in the physical
treatment of phase transitions although useful are not indispensable to give
an account of the phenomena. This follows from the fact that the thermo-
dynamic limit provides us with a controllable approximation of the behavior
of finite systems. My third claim is that the physics of phase transitions, in
particular renormalization group methods, can constitute a promising way
of giving a reductive explanation of stock market crashes. This will serve
not only to motivate the use of statistical mechanical methods in the study
of economic behavior, but also to contradict the claim that renormalization
group explanations are always non-reductive explanations.
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Doktorarbeit untersucht verschiedene philosophische Probleme, die mit
der Physik der Phasenübergängen zu tun haben. Insbesondere i) analysiere
ich, ob das klassische Phasenübergänge tatsächlich eine Herausforderung für
den Reduktionismus ist, ii) bewerte ich die Idee, dass eine unendliche Ide-
alisierung notwendig ist, um eine Erklärung der Phasenübergänge zu geben
und iii) diskutiere ich die Möglichkeit, die Physik der Phasenübergängen zu
verwenden, um eine reduktive Erklärung des kooperativen Verhaltens in der
Wirtschaft anzubieten.
Gegen prominente Ansprüche auf das Gegenteil verteidige ich die An-
sicht, dass Phasenübergänge Reduktionismus nicht untergraben, und dass sie
tatsächlich mit der Reduktion der Thermodynamik zur statistischen Mechanik
vereinbar sind. Ich behaupte, dass dieser Beschluss sogar im Falle von kon-
tinuierlichen Phasenübergängen folgt, wo es zwei unendliche Limes gibt.
Mein zweiter Anspruch besteht darin, dass die unendlichen Idealisierun-
gen an der physischen Behandlung von Phasenübergängen, obwohl nützlich,
nicht notwendig sind, um eine Erklärung der Phänomene zu geben. Das
folgt aus der Tatsache, dass die thermodynamische Limes uns mit einer kon-
trollierbaren Annäherung des Verhaltens von endlichen Systemen versorgt.
Mein dritter Anspruch besteht darin, dass die Physik von Phasenübergängen,
inbesondere die Renormalisierungsgruppe, eine versprechende Weise einset-
zen kann, eine reduktive Erklärung von Börsencrashs zu geben. Das wird
nicht nur dienen, um den Gebrauch von statistischen mechanischen Metho-
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den in der Studie des Wirtschaftsverhaltens zu verleiten, sondern auch um
dem Anspruch zu widersprechen, dass die Erklärung der Renormalisierungs-
gruppe immer nichtreduktive Erklärungen sind.
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Karim Thébault and Sean Gryb for encouraging me to start thinking about
the relationship between phase transitions and black holes.
I would like to thank the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD),
which awarded me a DAAD scholarship to support my doctoral studies, the
National Science Foundation (NSF), which partially supported my research
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A question that has puzzled scholars since Democritus is how exactly is it
that the macroworld of our everyday experience arises out of the behavior of
the microconstituents of matter. This is in fact the question that motivated
the development of statistical mechanics, which is a theory that aims to
explain how macroscopic phenomena, especially thermodynamic phenomena,
originate in the cooperative behavior of interacting lower level entities. From
its origin, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, until now, statistical
mechanics has successfully derived many macroscopic thermal phenomena
from the laws governing the interactions of microscopic constituents and
probabilistic assumptions, however in some important cases such a derivation
has been particularly problematic. One of those cases is the irreversible
approach to equilibrium and the other case, which is the one that I will focus
on in this dissertation, is equilibrium phase transitions.
Phase transitions are those sudden changes in the phenomenological prop-
erties of a system that we observe every time that we see liquid water turn-
ing into vapor. Other typical examples include the transition from a normal
conductor to a superconductor and from a paramagnetic to a ferromagnetic
phase in magnetic materials. Surprisingly, the microscopic explanation of
these everyday phenomena has constituted one of the major challenges of
11
statistical mechanics. In fact, in order to give such an account it has been
necessary the appeal to the thermodynamic limit, whereby the volume and
the number of particles go to infinity, and, in the case of continuous phase
transitions, the introduction of renormalization group methods, which is an
entirely new theoretical framework that basically consists in reducing the
number of effective degrees of freedom, losing information about the fine
grained details of the system.
The use of the thermodynamic limit and the introduction of renormaliza-
tion group techniques in the theory of phase transitions motivated an anti-
reductionist position among physicists working in condensed matter physics,
who considered phase transitions as a genuine example of emergent behav-
ior in physics. In his celebrated paper “More is Different” (Anderson 1972),
Philip Anderson says that the use of the thermodynamic limit “is not only
convenient but essential to realize that matter will undergo mathematically
sharp, singular ’phase transitions’” (p. 395). As a consequence of that, he
argues that the properties of a huge number of constituents, all working
together, were different from the behavior of a few of these particles. In
a similar vein, the statistical mechanic Lebowitz (1999) claims that phase
transitions are “paradigms of emergent behavior” (p.2), arguing that the
properties of this collective behavior had no counterpart in the behavior of
individual atoms.
Recently, considerations of this sort have entered the philosophical de-
bate and have been at the center of philosophical discussions on reduction,
idealizations and explanations in science. In this discussion, some philoso-
phers have argued that statistical mechanics cannot provide a full reductive
account of phase transitions in finite systems and that this undermines re-
ductionism, i.e. the belief that ultimately all macroscopic laws are reducible
to the fundamental microscopic laws of physics (i.e. Batterman 2011, Mor-
rison 2012, Bangu 2009). At the same time, it has been claimed that the
infinite idealization is indispensable to give an account of phase transitions
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(Batterman 2005, Jones 2006), which has led some of them to the conclusion
that discontinuities are physically real (Batterman 2005). Finally, it has been
said (Batterman and Rice 2014) that the use of renormalization group tech-
niques leads to a special kind of explanations in science which they regard
as non-reductive and non-causal.
In this dissertation, I address these positions and analyze the extent to
which the physical treatment of classical phase transitions actually call into
question important philosophical theses. Although I will admit that phase
transitions challenge various notions of reduction present in the physical and
philosophical literature, my main claim is that phase transitions do not un-
dermine reductionism and that they are in fact compatible with the reduction
of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics. Against prominent claims to the
contrary, I will defend the view that the statistical mechanical treatment of
these phenomena actually succeeds in building a connection between the
thermodynamic behavior of phase transitions and the cooperative behavior
of lower level entities.
My second claim is that the infinite idealizations involved in the physi-
cal treatment of phase transitions although useful are not indispensable to
give an account of the phenomena. This will follow from the fact that the
thermodynamic limit provides us with a controllable approximation of the
behavior of finite systems, which is not necessarily the case when other lim-
iting operations, such as the infinite-time limit, are involved.
My third claim is that the use of renormalization group techniques do
not necessarily lead to non-reductive explanations. Contra what has been
claimed by some philosophers (e.g. Batterman and Rice 2014), I will argue
that these methods can constitute a promising way of offering a reductive
account for the behavior of collective phenomena not only in physics but also
in the social sciences, in particular, in economics.
These claims will be made along the next three chapters, each of which is
to a large extent self-contained. In the next chapter (Chapter 2), I will focus
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on the problem of the reduction of phase transitions and argue that despite
the use of the thermodynamic limit and the introduction of renormalization
group methods, phase transitions are compatible with inter-theory reduction.
The notion of inter-theory reduction that I will endorse is a revised version
of Nickles’ (1973) notion of limiting reduction. This notion departs from the
traditional Nagelian model reduction, but in my view accommodates better
the limiting operations involved in the statistical mechanical treatment. In
the same chapter, I argue against the idea that the thermodynamic limit is
indispensable to give an account of phase transitions.
In Chapter 3, I put the emphasis on the justification for the empirical
success of infinite limits. After a systematic comparison between the ther-
modynamic limit in the theory of phase transitions and the infinite-time in
the ergodic theory of equilibrium, I will conclude that what allows for a justi-
fication of the empirical success of the thermodynamic limit is that this limit
is controllable, which means that one has control over how large the value of
the parameter must be assure that the infinite limit is a reasonable substitute
for a finite system. This will also serve to undermine claims about the in-
dispensability of the thermodynamic limit in the theory of phase transitions,
but it will make salient some problems associated with the justification of
the infinite-time limit in statistical mechanics.
Finally, in Chapter 4, I will indirectly address the question of whether
renormalization group explanations always constitute non-reductive expla-
nations. I will do so by considering a specific model of econophysics, the
Johansen-Ledot-Sornette (JLS) model that treats stock market crashes as
critical phase transitions and, therefore, uses renormalization group tech-
niques. After a careful analysis of the epistemic role of this highly idealized
model, I will conclude that this model constitutes a promising way of giv-
ing a reductive and causal explanation for stock market crashes that can
also help visualize possible avenues for intervention. This will serve not only
to motivate the use of statistical mechanical methods in the study of eco-
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nomic behavior, but also to contradict the idea that renormalization group
explanations are always non-reductive explanations.
Although this dissertation aims to resolve different problems that have
raised in the philosophical discussion around phase transitions, there are
many other issues associated with phase transitions that I will not be able
to address here. In Chapter 5, I will offer an overview of some of these issues
with the purpose of motivating the philosophical discussion on these topics.
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Chapter 2
Phase Transitions: A Challenge
for Reductionism?
“By convention sweet is sweet, bitter is bitter, hot is hot, cold
is cold, color is color; but in truth there are only atoms and the
void.” [Democritus, trans. Durant 1939]
2.1 Introduction
Phase transitions are sudden changes in the phenomenological properties of
a system. Some common examples include the transition from liquid to gas,
from a normal conductor to a superconductor, or from a paramagnet to a
ferromagnet. Nowadays phase transitions are considered one of the most
interesting and controversial cases in the analysis of inter-theory relations.
This is because they make particularly salient the constitutive role played by
idealizations in the inference of macroscopic behavior from a theory that de-
scribes microscopic interactions. In fact, it appears that statistical mechanics
– a well-established microscopic theory – cannot account for the behavior of
phase transitions as described by thermodynamics – a macroscopic theory –
without the help of infinite idealizations in the form of mathematical limits.
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In the discussion on phase transitions, physicists and philosophers alike
have mainly been concerned with the use of the thermodynamic limit, an
idealization that consists of letting the number of particles as well as the vol-
ume of the system go to infinity. For many authors (e.g. Bangu 2009, Bangu
2011; Batterman 2005; Batterman 2011, Morrison 2012) this idealization has
an important philosophical consequence: it implies that phase transitions are
emergent phenomena. As a result, they claim that such phenomena present
a challenge for reductionism, i.e. the belief that ultimately all macroscopic
laws are reducible to the fundamental microscopic laws of physics.
On the other hand, numerous other authors (e.g. Butterfield 2011; But-
terfield and Buoatta 2011; Norton 2012; Callender 2001; Menon and Cal-
lender 2013) have rejected this conclusion, arguing that the appeal to the
infinite limit does not represent a problem for reductionism. Some of them
(Butterfield 2011, Norton 2012) have even argued that phase transitions, in-
stead of threatening reductionism, are paradigmatic examples of Nagelian
reduction, whereby reduction is understood in terms of logical deduction.
These last remarks, however, have not ended the debate. In particular,
the physical treatment of continuous phase transitions that implements renor-
malization group (RG) techniques is still regarded as especially problematic
for the reductionist attitude towards phase transitions (e.g. Batterman 2011,
Morrison 2012).
In this chapter, I analyze the extent to which classical phase transitions,
especially continuous phase transitions, impose a challenge for reductionism.
My main contention is that classical phase transitions are, in fact, compatible
with reduction, at least with the notion of reduction that relates the behavior
of physical quantities in different theories under certain limiting conditions.
I argue that this conclusion follows even if one recognizes the existence of
two infinite limits involved in the physics of continuous phase transitions.
To reach my goal, I organize this chapter as follows. In the next sec-
tion (Section 2.2), I describe the physics of phase transitions, outlining how
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statistical mechanics recovers thermodynamical behavior. Here I emphasize
that in the RG treatment of continuous phase transitions, apart from the
thermodynamic limit, there is a second infinite limit involved. Subsequently
(Section 2.3), I further develop the concept of limiting reduction suggested
by Nickles (1973). Based on that notion of reduction, I contend (Section
4) that, despite some objections, first-order phase transitions satisfy Nick-
les’ criterion of limiting reduction. However, I also show that continuous
phase transitions do not satisfy this criterion due to the existence of the sec-
ond infinite limit. In Section 5, I suggest to liberalize the notion of limiting
reduction and I argue that continuous phase transitions fulfill this notion.
This paper concludes by describing some attempts to apply RG methods to
finite systems, which indeed support the claim that thermodynamical phase
transitions are reducible to statistical mechanics.
2.2 From Statistical Mechanics to the Ther-
modynamics of Phase Transitions
Statistical mechanics aims to account for the macroscopic behavior typically
described by thermodynamics in terms of the laws that govern microscopic
interactions. In the philosophical literature, the reproduction of the thermo-
dynamic results by statistical mechanics is generally referred to in terms of
reduction. In this section, I will describe how statistical mechanics recovers
the thermodynamic behavior of phase transitions and will explain why phase
transitions are an interesting and puzzling case for the project of reducing
thermodynamics to statistical mechanics.
2.2.1 The Thermodynamics of Phase Transitions
In thermodynamics, phases correspond to regions of the parameter space
(known as a phase diagram) where the values of the parameters uniquely
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specify equilibrium states. Phase boundaries, in contrast, correspond to
values of parameters at which two different equilibrium states can coexist.
The coexistence of states expresses itself as discontinuities of thermodynamic
quantities, like volume, which are related to the first derivatives of the free
energy with respect to a parameter such as pressure or temperature. If the
system goes from one phase to another intersecting a phase boundary, the
system is said to undergo a first-order phase transition. This name is due to
the fact that the discontinuous jumps occur in the first derivatives of the free
energy. On the other hand, if the system moves from one phase to another
without intersecting any coexistence line, the system is said to undergo a
continuous phase transition, in which case there are no discontinuities in-
volved in the first derivatives of the free energy but there are divergencies in
the response functions (e.g. specific heat, susceptibility for a magnet, com-
pressibility for a fluid). An example of a first-order phase transition is the
passage from liquid water to vapor at the boiling point, where the quanti-
ties that experience discontinuous jumps are entropy and volume, which are
first derivatives of the free energy with respect to temperature and pressure
respectively. An example of continuous phase transition instead is the transi-
tion in magnetic materials from the phase with spontaneous magnetization –
the ferromagnetic phase – to the phase where the spontaneous magnetization
vanishes – the paramagnetic phase –. (Figure 1)
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Figure 1: Phase diagram for the paramagnetic–ferromagnetic transi-
tion. Here H is the external magnetic field and T the temperature.
At the transition or critical point TC the spontaneous magnetization
M vanishes.
Although both first-order and continuous phase transitions are of great
interest for the project of reducing thermodynamics to statistical mechanics,
the latter kind is considered to be more controversial than the former. The
reason is that continuous phase transitions have characteristic properties that
are much more difficult to recover from statistical mechanics than first-order
phase transitions. One of those properties is that, in the vicinity of a contin-
uous phase transition, measurable quantities depend upon one another in a
power-law fashion. For example, in the ferromagnetic-paramagnetic transi-
tion, the net magnetization M , the magnetic susceptibility χ, and the specific
heat C depend on the reduced temperature t = T−Tc
Tc
(the temperature of the
system with respect to the critical temperature Tc) as follows:
M ∼ |t|β, C ∼ |t|−α, χ ∼ |t|−γ,
where β, α, γ are the critical exponents. Another remarkable property of
continuous phase transitions is that radically different systems, such as flu-
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ids and ferromagnets, have exactly the same values of critical exponents, a
property known as universality.
Finally, continuous phase transitions are also characterized by the diver-
gence of some physical quantities at the transition or critical point. The
critical exponents α and γ are typically (although not always) positive, so
that the power laws that have negative exponents (and the corresponding
quantities like specific heat and susceptibility) diverge as T → Tc. The
divergence of the magnetic susceptibility χ implies the divergence of the cor-
relation length ξ, a quantity that measures the distance over which the spins
are correlated, which also obeys power-law behavior: ξ ∼ |t|−ν . The di-
vergence of the correlation length is perhaps the most important feature of
continuous phase transitions because it involves the loss of a characteristic
scale at the transition point and thus provides a basis for universal behavior.
The inference of the experimental values of critical exponents – or ade-
quate relations among them – together with the account of universality has
been one the major challenges of statistical mechanics. We will see next that,
in order to provide such an account, it was necessary to appeal to infinite ide-
alizations and to RG methods, an entirely new theoretical framework, which
basically consists in reducing the number of effective degrees of freedom of
the system.
2.2.2 The Importance of the Thermodynamic Limit
We saw in the previous section that the macroscopic behavior of first-order
phase transitions is defined in terms of singularities or non-analyticities in
the first derivatives of the free energy. Gibbsian statistical mechanics offers
a precise definition of the free energy F , given by:
F (Kn) = −κBT lnZ, (2.1)
where Kn is the set of coupling constants, κB is the Boltzmannian constant,
T is the temperature, and Z is the canonical partition function, defined as
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the sum over all possible configurations:
Z =
∑
i
eβHi . (2.2)
When trying to use statistical mechanics to recover the non-analyticities
that describe phase transitions in thermodynamics, the following problem
arises. Since the Hamiltonian H is usually a non-singular function of the de-
grees of freedom, it follows that the partition function, which depends on the
Hamiltonian, is a sum of analytic functions. This means that neither the free
energy, defined as the logarithm of the partition function, nor its derivatives
can have the singularities that characterize first-order phase transitions in
thermodynamics. Taking the thermodynamic limit, which consists of letting
the number of particles as well as the volume of the system go to infinity
N →∞, V →∞ in such a way that the density remains finite, allows one to
recover those singularities. In this sense, the use of this limit appears essential
for the recovery of the thermodynamic values, which motivated Kadanoff’s
controversial claim: “phase transitions cannot occur in finite systems, phase
transitions are solely a property of infinite systems” (Kadanoff, 2009, p. 7).
The appeal to the thermodynamic limit is also found in the descrip-
tion of continuous phase transitions. Consider again the paramagnetic-
ferromagnetic transition. This is a continuous phase transition defined in
terms of the divergence of the magnetic susceptibility at the critical temper-
ature and characterized by the appearance of spontaneous magnetization in
the absence of an external magnetic field. From a statistical mechanical point
of view, the appearance of spontaneous magnetization in finite systems is,
strictly speaking, impossible. The impossibility is due to the up-down sym-
metry of the lattice models used in the study of magnetization, including the
Ising model. A consequence of up-down symmetry is that for zero external
field H the magnetization obeys the symmetry condition M = −M , whose
unique solution is M = 0. That means that the magnetization M with zero
external magnetic field H must be zero (Details elsewhere, e.g. Goldenfeld
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1992, Sec. 4; Le Bellac, Mortessagne, and Batrouni 2006, Sec. 4). This so-
called “impossibility theorem” can be avoided by taking the thermodynamic
limit N →∞ followed by the limits H → 0+ and H → 0−:
M = lim
H→0+
lim
N→∞
1
N
∂F (H)
∂H
6= 0
−M = lim
H→0−
lim
N→∞
1
N
∂F (H)
∂H
6= 0.
Notice that since M and −M have different values and are different from
zero, the magnetic susceptibility, defined as the derivative of the magnetiza-
tion with respect to an external field, diverges to infinity in the neighborhood
of the zero external field. One can see, therefore, that taking the thermo-
dynamic limit not only provides the concept of spontaneous magnetization
with precise meaning but also allows for the recovery of the divergence of the
thermodynamic quantities that characterizes continuous phase transitions.
2.2.3 The Appeal to a Second Limit: Infinite Iteration
of RG Transformations
In an ideal scenario, one would expect to perform a direct calculation of
the partition function. Unfortunately, analytic calculations of the partition
functions have been performed only in particular models with dimension
D = 1 or D = 2; for all other cases, one requires to use approximation
techniques.1 The most useful approximation for the case of first-order phase
transitions is the mean field approximation, which employs the assumption
that each spin acts as if it were independent of the others, feeling only the
average mean field. Although the mean field approximation proved to be
1The first and most famous exact solution of the partition function is the Onsager
solution for an Ising model of dimension D=2.
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successful in some cases of first order phase transitions, experiments have
shown that this account fails to give accurate predictions for the case of
continuous phase transitions, in which the correlation length diverges. It is
believed that this failure is due to the fact that mean field theories neglect
fluctuations whereas fluctuations govern the behavior near the critical point.
A more complete account of continuous phase transitions requires the use
of RG methods. These methods are mathematical and conceptual tools that
allow one to solve a problem involving long-range correlations by generating
a succession of simpler (generally local) models. The goal of these meth-
ods is to find a transformation that successively coarse-grains the effective
degrees of freedom but keeps the partition function and the free energy (ap-
proximately) invariant. The usefulness of RG methods lies in the fact that
one can compute the critical exponents and other universal properties with-
out having to calculate the free energy. This methods also allow to account
for universality, the remarkable fact that entirely different systems behave
qualitatively and quantitatively in the same way near the critical point.
To give a specific illustration of RG methods, let us consider a block spin
transformation for a simple Ising model on the two-dimensional square lat-
tice with distance a between spins.2 Here, the spins have two possible values,
namely ±1. If it is assumed that the spins interact only with an external
magnetic field h and with their nearest neighbors through the exchange in-
teraction K (meaning that the coupling constants are only K and h), the
Hamiltonian H for the model is given by:
H = −K
N∑
ij
SiSj +−h
∑
i
Si. (2.3)
2For simplicity, I am going to restrict the analysis to real-space renormalization. How-
ever, I think that the same conclusions apply to momentum-space renormalization. For
details on the difference between real-space and momentum space-renormalization, see
Wilson and Kogut (1974) and Fisher (1998). For a philosophical account on the difference
between those two frameworks see Franklin (2017)
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By applying the majority rule, which imposes the selection of one state
of spin based on the states of the majority of spins within a block, one can
replace the spins within a block of side la by a single block spin. Thus, one
obtains a system that provides a coarse-grained description of the original
system.
If one assumes further that the possible values for each block spin SI are
the same as in the Ising model, namely ±1, and also that the block spins
interact only with nearest neighbor block spins and an external field, the
effective Hamiltonian H ′ will have the same form as the original Hamiltonian
H:
H ′ = −K ′
Nl−d∑
IJ
SISJ +−h′
∑
I
SI . (2.4)
Formally, this is equivalent to applying a transformation R to the original
system, so that H ′ = R[H], in which the partition function and the free
energy remain approximately invariant.3
Although the systems described by H and H ′ have the same form, the
correlation length in the coarse-grained system ξ[K ′] is smaller than the
correlation length ξ[K] of the original system. This follows from the fact
that the correlation length in the effective model is measured in units of the
spacing la whereas the correlation length in the original system is measured
in units of the spacing a. In other words, the correlation length is rescaled
by a factor l. The expression that relates the correlation lengths of the two
systems is:
ξ[K]
l
= ξ[K ′]. (2.5)
3The previous example captures the spirit of real-space RG methods. However in
practice RG transformations consist of complicated non-linear transformations that do
not preserve the form of the original Hamiltonian. This allows for the possibility that new
local operators are generated during the RG transformation (Details in Goldenfeld 1992,
p. 235).
25
After n iterations of the RG transformation, the characteristic linear di-
mension of the system is ln. Thus the correlation lengths in the sequence of
coarse-grained models vary according to:
ξ[K] = lξ[K ′] = ... = lnξ[K(n)]. (2.6)
The idea is that one iterates the RG transformation until fluctuations at
all scales up to the physical correlation length ξ are averaged out. In many
cases, this involves numerous iterations (Details elsewhere, e.g. Le Bellac et
al. 2006, Sec. 4.4.3; Goldenfeld 1992, Sec. 9.3).
It follows from equation (6) that for a large correlation length, the number
of iterations should be large. For an infinite correlation length, which is
the case of continuous phase transitions, the number of iterations should be
infinite.4 Indeed, if the original correlation length ξ[K] is infinite and we
want to eliminate all effective degrees of freedom, i.e. we want the effective
correlation length to be small, then we are forced to take the limit n→∞ in
the right hand side of equation (6) such that the following expression holds:
ξ[K] = lim
n→∞
lnξ[K(n)] =∞ (2.7)
This result is important because it demonstrates the existence of two
different infinite limits involved in the theory of phase transitions. The first is
the thermodynamic limit that takes us to a system with an infinite correlation
length. The second is the limit for the number of RG iterations going to
infinity that takes us to a fixed point Hamiltonian, i.e. the Hamiltonian with
the coupling constants equal to their fixed point values: [K∗] = R[K∗]. These
fixed points can be also thought of as stationary or limiting distributions to
which the renormalization group trajectories converge after infinite iterations
4In order to maintain the system at criticality, one performs a sort of double rescaling
process: one changes scale in space and also changes the distance to criticality in coupling
space (Details in Sornette 2000, p. 232).
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of the RG transformation n → ∞. This point will be crucial for what will
be argued in Sections 3.3 and 5.2.
Although the iteration of the RG transformation preserves the symme-
tries of the original system, it does not preserve the value of the original
Hamiltonian, and, therefore, it does not preserve the value of the set of cou-
pling constants [K] associated with the corresponding Hamiltonians. Thus,
the iteration of the RG transformation can be thought of as describing a
sequence of points moving in a space of coupling constants Kn or a corre-
sponding space of Hamiltonians H. If the sequence describes a system at the
critical point, after infinite iterations n→∞ it will converge to a non-trivial
fixed point [K*] given by:
[K∗] = R[K∗] (2.8)
The other possible fixed points are trivial, namely K = 0 and K =∞, which
correspond to low and high temperature fixed points respectively.
At fixed points the coupling constants remain invariant under the trans-
formation. Therefore, varying the length scale does not change the value
of the Hamiltonian and therefore brings us to a physically identical system.
This latter feature associates fixed points with the property of scale invari-
ance, which means that the system looks statistically (and physically) the
same at different scales.
It has been shown that by linearizing in the vicinity of the fixed point, one
can calculate the values of the critical exponents and the relations between
them (Details in Goldenfeld 1992, Sec. 9; Domb 2000, Sec. 7; Sornette
2000, Sec. 11). This is remarkable because it demonstrates that the critical
exponents are solely controlled by the RG trajectory near the fixed point and
that one does not need to calculate the free energy to determine the behavior
of the system in the vicinity of the critical point. This means also that the
initial values of the coupling constants do not determine the critical behavior.
The latter constitutes the origin of the explanation of universality because it
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tells us that systems that flow towards the same fixed point are governed by
the same critical exponents, even if they are originally described by different
coupling constants. The systems that flow towards the same fixed point –
that are in the basin of attraction of the fixed point – are said to be in the
same universality class.
In summary, we have seen that the recovery of the thermodynamic proper-
ties from statistical mechanics involves: i) first, the introduction of particular
assumptions (e.g. lattice structure, a particular kind of degrees of freedom,
ranges of values of the degrees of freedom, and dimension) that allow one
to build a specific model (Ising model in our case study); ii) second, the
assumption of the thermodynamic limit, which brings us to a fine-grained
system with infinite number of particles and infinite correlation length;5 and
iii) finally, the assumption of a second infinite limit that consists of an infinite
number of iterations of a coarse-graining transformation. This limit takes us
to a fixed point Hamiltonian that represents a coarse-grained model. After
those steps are made, the most important statistical mechanical approaches
can make accurate predictions of the behavior of continuous phase transitions
and explain universal behavior. Figure 2 illustrates this process. Notice, how-
ever, that in the case of first-order phase transitions, one could in principle
derive the thermodynamic behavior just after taking the first limit.6
5Recently, Norton (2012) has challenged the appeal to an infinite system in the theory
of phase transitions. His contention is that the limit system would have properties that
are not suitable to describe phase transitions, such as the violation of determinism and
energy conservation. This point is relevant for his distinction between idealizations and
approximations, which led him to the conclusion that phase transitions are a case of
approximation and not idealization. Since we are trying to make a different point here,
we are going to adhere to the standard façon de parler that refers to the existence of an
“infinite system” (e.g. Kadanoff 2009; Fisher 1998; Butterfield 2011). This does not mean
that our view is incompatible with Norton’s view.
6One should bear in mind that although RG methods are not required to infer the
behavior of first-order phase transitions, they can be (and have been) used to describe
these kinds of transitions as well. See Goldenfeld (1992, Sec. 9).
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Coarse-grained model Thermodynamic Predictions
limn→∞
limN →∞
6
-
Infinite Fine-Grained Model
6
Finite Fine-Grained Model SM plus Initial Assumptions
Figure 2: Inter-theory relation for continuous phase transitions.
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2.3 The Concept of Limiting Reduction
What has been at stake in the philosophical debate around phase transitions
is whether the thermodynamic description of these phenomena reduces to
statistical mechanics. Even if the previous section showed that statistical
mechanics can reproduce the non-analyticities that describe phase transitions
in thermodynamics, the appeal to the infinite idealizations throws suspicion
to the legitimacy of such a reduction. The main aim of Sections 4 and 5
is to evaluate whether the infinite idealizations mentioned in Section 2 are
compatible with the reduction of phase transitions. However, given that the
term “reduction” is notoriously ambiguous, before we can assess this issue,
some clarifications as to how this term is constructed in this context are
necessary. This is the task of the present section.
2.3.1 Nickles’ Concept of Limiting Reduction
Since we are interested in relating the thermodynamic treatment of phase
transitions with another theory that aims to describe the same phenomena,
we are treating phase transitions as a potential case of inter-theory reduc-
tion, where reduction is taken as a relation between two theories (or parts
of theories). This kind of reduction is to be distinguished from other types
of reduction such as whole-parts reduction.7 More specifically, since the
description of the phenomenon in the two theories coincides only by assum-
ing a limit process, the case of interest is a candidate for a specific class
of inter-theory reduction sometimes called limiting or asymptotic reduction
(Landsman, 2013).
Nickles (1973, pp. 197-201), who was the first to distinguish limiting re-
duction from other classes of inter-theory reduction, calls this type of reduc-
tion reduction2 (henceforth LR2) to distinguish it from reduction1, which
corresponds to Nagelian reduction. He characterizes LR2 in the following
7See Norton (2012) for a clear distinction between these two kinds of reduction.
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way:
LR2: A theory TB (secondary theory) reduces to another TA
(fundamental theory), iff the values of the relevant quantities of
TA become the values of the corresponding quantities of TB by
performing a limit operation on TA.
8
According to Nickles, the motivation for this type of reduction is heuristic
and justificatory. The development of the new (or fundamental) theory TA
is motivated heuristically by the requirement that, in the limit, one obtains
the same values as the predecessor (or secondary) theory TB for the relevant
quantities. As such, TA is also justified as it can account adequately for
the domain described by TB. Nickles is also emphatic in pointing out that
this kind of reduction is to be distinguished from reduction1, which, as I said
above, corresponds to Nagelian reduction. He clarifies that whereas Nagelian
reduction requires the old (or secondary) theory to be embedded entirely in
the new theory, limiting reduction only requires that the two theories make
the same predictions for the relevant quantities when a limiting operation
is performed. In this way, reduction2, in contrast to reduction1, does not
require the logical derivation of one theory from another and, therefore, does
not require logical consistency between the two theories (Nickles, 1973, p.
186). Since Nickles’ reduction2 does not make any reference to explanation,
logical deduction or the ontological status of reduction, which are aspects of
more standard philosophical conceptions of reduction, this type of reduction
8Nickles (1973) inverts the order of “reducing” theory and theory “to be reduced”
used by philosophers. According to him, the “reducing theory” is the theory that results
from the limit operation and the theory “to be reduced” is the theory in which the limit
operation is performed. This terminology is motivated by the way in which physicists
use the term “reduce to”. Since this notation is not relevant for Nickles’ general concept
of limiting reduction, I will use the term according to the philosophers’ jargon and not
following Nickles’ terminology.
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is often regarded as the “physical sense” of reduction (e.g. Nickles 1973;
Rohrlich 1988; Batterman 2016).
2.3.2 Beyond Nickles’ Concept of Reduction
In order to evaluate potential cases of limiting reduction, it is useful to have
a formal definition at hand. Batterman (2016) advances such a definition by
proposing the following schema (which he calls Schema R, henceforth SR):
SR : A theory TB reduces asymptotically to another TA iff:
lim
x→∞
TA = TB,
where x represents a fundamental parameter appearing in TA. TA is generally
taken as the fundamental theory and TB is typically taken as a secondary
or coarser theory.9 For Batterman, the relation between two theories can
be called “reductive” if the solutions of the relevant laws of the theory TA
smoothly approach the solutions of the corresponding laws in TB, or in other
words, if the “limiting behavior” of the relevant laws, with x → ∞, equals
the “behavior in the limit”, where x =∞.
It could be objected, however, that Batterman’s Schema R is not precise
enough since, strictly speaking, the limit is taken on functions representing
quantities (or properties) of a theory rather than on the theory itself. More-
over, even if two functions representing the same physical quantity in TA and
TB respectively coincide when a limit is taken, that does not guarantee the
reduction of an entire theory to another. In fact, it might be possible for the
functions representing a given quantity in the fundamental and secondary
theory to be related by limiting reduction while for another quantity the
9In the original formulation, Batterman (2016) defines schema R, using ε→ 0 instead
of x→∞. For consistency with other parts of this paper, I instead express schema R as
considering the limit to infinity x → ∞. Whether one formulates x → ∞ or ε → 0 does
not make a difference in the content of this schema.
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corresponding functions fail to do so. A more precise definition of limiting
reduction, formulated only in terms of the quantities to be compared, is as
follows:
LR3: A quantity Q
B of TB reduces asymptotically to a quantity
QA of TA if:
lim
x→∞
Qx
A = QB,
where x represents a parameter appearing in TA, on which the function rep-
resenting Qx
A depends. According to this definition, one is thus allowed
to call a relation between quantities “reductive” if the values of the quan-
tity Qx
A smoothly approach the values of the quantity QB when the limit
x → ∞ is taken. Naturally, in order to obtain the reduction of one theory
to another, one would require that the values of all the physically significant
quantities of the reduced theory coincide with the values of the quantities
of the fundamental theory under certain conditions.10 Proving this in every
case is a huge enterprise, but note that, according to the above framework,
the failure of reduction of one of the relevant quantities suffices to infer the
failure of reduction of an entire theory to another. As it will be seen in the
next section, this is exactly what is at stake in the case of phase transitions.
Before going there though, more specifications regarding the concept of
limiting reduction are necessary. For example, it can still be argued that
definition LR3 is far too strict since it requires that the values obtained
by performing a limit operation on a quantity Qx
A are exactly the same
as the values of QB. In most cases this condition is not satisfied. Take,
for instance, the concept of entropy as it is defined in thermodynamics and
in Bolzmannian statistical mechanics. In thermodynamics, such a quantity
10Note, however, that here we assume that the two quantities have some qualitative
features in common that make them candidates for reduction. An important topic that
deserves to be addressed in future research regards the issue of whether quantitative co-
incidence suffices to infer correspondence between two quantities of different theories.
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reaches its maximum value at equilibrium and does not allow for fluctuations.
In contrast, Bolzmannian entropy is a probabilistic quantity that fluctuates
every now and then even when the system has reached equilibrium. Cases
like this motivated many authors (including Nickles himself) to allow for
“approximate reduction”. Accordingly, one can reformulate LR3 as follows :
LR4: A quantity Q
B of TB reduces asymptotically to a quantity
QA of TA if:
lim
x→∞
Qx
A ≈ QB,
where “≈” means “approximates”, “is similar to”, or “is analogous to”. This
means that a quantity Qx
A reduces another quantity QB if the values of Qx
A
approximate the values of QB when the limit x→∞ is taken.
2.4 Are Continuous Phase Transitions Incom-
patible with Reduction?
In order to judge whether phase transitions correspond to a case of reduction,
one needs to specify which quantities of TA and TB are expected to display
the same values when a certain limit is taken. Subsequently, one needs
to evaluate whether these quantities relate to each other according to the
definitions provided in the previous section.
In both first-order and continuous phase transitions one is interested in
comparing quantities of statistical mechanics with quantities of classical ther-
modynamics, where statistical mechanics is taken as the reducing theory TA
and classical thermodynamics as the theory to be reduced TB. As it was
shown in Section 2.2, in the case of first-order phase transitions one takes
the thermodynamic limit to obtain the singularities in the derivatives of the
free energy that successfully describe the phenomenon in thermodynamics.
Following definition LR4, one will say that the derivatives of the free energy
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in thermodynamics are reduced to the corresponding quantities in statistical
mechanics if
lim
N→∞
F SMN ≈ F TD,
where F SM represents a derivative of the free energy as defined in statistical
mechanics and F TD the corresponding quantity in thermodynamics.
The case of continuous phase transitions is different, because, in general,
one is not interested in computing the free energy but rather in calculating
the universal quantities, like the critical exponents, and in explaining uni-
versality. In other words, one uses the thermodynamic limit and the infinite
iteration limit to calculate the critical exponents that control the behavior
of the system close to the critical point.
2.4.1 The Problem of “Singular” Limits
The view that phase transitions are not a case of limiting reduction has been
most notably developed by Batterman (2001; 2005; 2011). He argues that
this is a consequence of the “singular” nature of the thermodynamic limit.11
Using Batterman’s terminology, a limit is singular “if the behavior in the
limit is of a fundamentally different character than the nearby solutions one
obtains as ε → 0” (Batterman, 2005, p. 2). According to him, the thermo-
dynamic limit is singular in this sense because no matter how large we take
the number of particles N to be, as long as the system is finite, the deriva-
tives of the free energy will never display a singularity. As a consequence,
he says that taking the limit of the free energy of finite statistical mechanics
F SM does not allow us to construct a model or theory that approximates the
thermodynamic behavior.
The idea that we can find analytic partition functions that “ap-
proximate” singularities is mistaken, because the very notion of
11Similar views are also held by Rueger (2000) and Morrison (2012).
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approximation required fails to make sense when the limit is sin-
gular. The behavior at the limit (the physical discontinuity, the
phase transition) is qualitatively different from the limiting be-
havior as that limit is approached (Batterman, 2005, p. 14).
This means that phase transitions would not even satisfy definition LR4
stated in Section 4.
Although Batterman’s argument is plausible, Butterfield (2011) (and But-
terfield and Buoatta (2011)) challenges his reasoning using the following
mathematical example. Consider the following sequence of functions:
gN(x) =

−1 if x ≤ −1/N
Nx if − 1/N ≤ x ≤ 1/N)
1 if x ≥ 1/N
As N goes to infinity, the sequence converges pointwise to the discontin-
uous function:
g∞(x) =

−1 if x < 0
0 if x = 0
1 if x > 0
If one introduces another function f , such that
f =
1 if g is discontinuous0 if g is continuous
then one will conclude, in the same vein as Batterman, that the value of f∞
at the limit N = ∞ is fundamentally different from the value when N is
arbitrarily large but finite. However, Butterfield warns us that if we look at
the behavior of the function g, we will see that the limit value of the function
is approached smoothly and therefore that the limit system is not “singular”
in the previous sense.
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According to Butterfield, this is exactly what happens with classical phase
transitions and, for the cases analyzed here, he seems right.12 Consider again
the paramagnetic-ferromagnetic transition discussed in Section 2.1. This
transition is characterized by the divergence of a second derivative of the free
energy - the magnetic susceptibility χ - at the critical point. If we introduce
a quantity that represents the divergence of the magnetic susceptibility and
attribute a value 1 if the magnetic susceptibility diverges and 0 if it does
not (analogously to the function f in Butterfield’s example), then we might
conclude that such a quantity will have values for the limit system that are
considerably different from the values of the of systems close to the limit,
i.e. for large but finite N . As a consequence, we will say that definition LR4
fails. However, if we focus on the behavior of a different quantity, namely
the magnetic susceptibility itself χ, we will arrive at a different conclusion.
In fact, as N grows, the change in the magnetization becomes steeper and
steeper so that the magnetic susceptibility smoothly approaches a divergence
in the limit (analogous to the function g). This result is important because
it tells us that definition LR4 holds:
lim
N→∞
χN
SM ≈ χTD,
where χSM and χTD are taken as the magnetic susceptibility in statistical
mechanics and thermodynamics respectively. The existence of finite statisti-
cal systems whose quantities approximate qualitatively the thermodynamic
quantities for the case of first-order and continuous phase transitions has
been also corroborated by Monte Carlo simulations (I will come back to this
12Even if Butterfield aims to make a more general claim, this does not hold for all cases of
“singular” limits. Landsman (2013) shows that for the case of quantum systems displaying
spontaneous symmetry breaking and the classical limit h̄→ 0 of quantum mechanics, the
situation is different and much more challenging. It seems therefore that the analysis of
singular limits and the way of “dissolving the mystery” around them should be done on a
case-by-case basis.
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point in Section 6).
The important lesson from Butterfield’s argument is that the “singular”
nature of the thermodynamic limit does not imply that there are no models of
statistical mechanics that approximate the thermodynamic behavior of phase
transitions, for N sufficiently large but finite. If we assume that inter-theory
reduction is consistent with the fact that the quantities of the secondary
theory are only approximated by the quantities of the fundamental theory
(as suggested by schema LR4), then we arrive at the important conclusion
that the “singular” nature of the thermodynamic limit is not per se in tension
with the reduction of phase transitions.
One needs to be cautious, however, in not concluding that the previous
argument solves all the controversy around the reduction of phase transitions.
First of all, it is important to bear in mind that we are referring only to
classical phase transitions and that quantum phase transitions have not been
considered.13 Second, one needs to note that we have not considered the use
of renormalization group methods yet, in which there are two infinite limits
involved. This is precisely the issue that we are going to address next.
2.4.2 Implementing RG Methods
As was shown in Section 2, the inference of the thermodynamic behavior of
continuous phase transitions generally requires the appeal to RG methods.
Batterman (2011) has suggested that the assumption of RG methods imposes
a further challenge for the project of reducing phase transitions to statistical
mechanics. He attributes this difficulty to the need for the thermodynamic
limit in the inference of fixed point solutions, which are said to be neces-
sary for the computation of critical exponents and for giving an account of
universality. He claims (2011, p. 23):
Notice the absolutely essential role played by the divergence of the
13For an analysis of quantum phase transitions see Landsman (2013).
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correlation length in this explanatory story. It is this that opens
up the possibility of a fixed point solution to the renormalization
group equations. Without that divergence and the corresponding
loss of characteristic scale, no calculation of the exponent would
be possible.
Why is it that the thermodynamic limit appears to be so important in
the inference of non-trivial fixed points? The reason is that in every finite
system there will be a characteristic length scale associated to the size of
the system. Therefore, the application of a coarse-graining transformation
beyond that length will no longer give identical statistical systems and the
“RG flow” will inevitably move towards a trivial fixed point, with values of
the coupling constants either K = 0 or K =∞.
Figure 3 describes a contour map sketching the topology of the renormal-
ization group flow and serves to illustrate the previous situation. Here the
RG flows are represented by the trajectories R and D in a space S of Hamil-
tonians. Each point in this space represents a physical system described by a
particular Hamiltonian associated with a set of coupling constants K. In this
topology, the elements of S can be classified according to their correlation
lengths ξ. Therefore, one can define surfaces containing all Hamiltonians
H ∈ S with a given correlation length. For example, the critical surface
describes the set of all Hamiltonians with infinite correlation length ξ =∞.
In the figure, p represents a system with a Hamiltonian that inhabits the
critical surface ξ = ∞, whereas s represents a system with a Hamiltonian
that is infinitesimally close to p but is not on the critical surface; p∗ and p0
are fixed points. As one can see, the trajectory starting from s will stay close
to trajectory R, describing a system at criticality, but eventually will move
away towards a trivial fixed point. This follows because in a finite system
the RG transformation will constantly reduce the value of the correlation
length, moving the system away from criticality and resulting in a system
with trivial values of coupling constants. As a result, two neighbor systems
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will approach far away fixed-points when a RG transformation is repeated
infinitely many times, i.e. when n→∞, and therefore the two neighbor sys-
tems will approach two different limiting distributions describing physically
diverse systems. Since the values of the critical exponents can be calculated
by linearizing around non-trivial fixed points, this naturally means that it-
erating the RG transformation infinitely many times in a finite system will
lead us to a fixed point from which one will be able neither to compute the
critical exponents nor to give an account of universality. Taking into account
that the critical exponents describe the behavior of the physical quantities Q
close to the critical point, one can formally express this fact as follows. For
N being arbitrarily large but finite:
lim
n→∞
QN,n
SM 6≈ QTD,
where n is the number of iterations, QSM represents a quantity of statisti-
cal mechanics controlled by the critical exponents, whereas QTD represents
the corresponding quantity in thermodynamics whose values match with the
experimental results.
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Figure 3: Contour map sketching the topology of the renormalization
group flow (R). s and p represent systems infinitesimally close to each
other. p∗ is a critical fixed point and p0 is a trivial-fixed point.
This is what led Batterman and others, for example Morrison (2012), to
stress the importance of the thermodynamic limit. In fact, one can see from
the argument given above that only systems with infinite correlation length
(associated with a loss of characteristic scale) will approach non-trivial fixed
points after infinite iterations of the RG transformation. The point that
these authors do not emphasize is, however, that it is by taking the infinite
iteration limit n → ∞ that one approaches trivial fixed points from which
one can neither explain universality nor calculate the critical exponents. If
one realizes this, then the question that arises is whether in a finite system
one can recover the experimental values of the critical exponents only after a
finite number of iterations of the renormalization group transformations, i.e.
without taking the second limit. This will be addressed in the next section.
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2.5 Approximation, Topology and the Reduc-
tion of Continuous Phase Transitions
Before assessing the reducibility of continuous phase transitions, let us discuss
the notion of approximation involved in the concept of limiting reduction. In
the definition suggested by Nickles (and also in the revised versions mentioned
in Section 4), there is implicit a precise criterion of approximation given by
the convergence of the values of quantities in the fundamental theory to
the values of the corresponding quantities in the secondary theory (See also
Scheibe 1998, Hüttermann and Love 2016, Fletcher 2015).14 We saw that,
in cases where the quantitative and qualitative behavior of phase transitions
can be inferred solely by taking the thermodynamic limit, this criterion of
approximation well captures the idea of the reducibility of the quantities that
describe phase transitions. The cases mentioned in Section 4.1 are examples
of this.
Unfortunately, one cannot use the same criterion of approximation in
cases in which taking the thermodynamic limit is not sufficient to infer the
thermodynamic behavior. The reason is that, as we saw, in the case of con-
tinuous phase transitions one generally infers the thermodynamic behavior
and explains universality only after performing a second limiting operation,
which consists of applying repeatedly an RG transformation in the parameter
space until the trajectory converges towards a non-trivial fixed point. Such
a convergence does not, however, give us the criterion of approximation that
can be used to determine whether phase transitions are a case of reduction.
This is because when we ask about reduction, we are interested in analyz-
ing the behavior of finite systems. Instead, the points of the RG trajectory
describing a system at criticality are confined to the critical surface, corre-
sponding to points with infinite correlation length ξ =∞, and that does not
give us any information about the behavior of finite systems.
14The convergence involved in limiting relations is generally pointwise and not uniform.
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The challenge that the reductionist needs to face is that every point in
a space of coupling constants that describes a system with finite correlation
length will approach a trivial fixed point when the infinite iteration limit is
taken. In this sense, if one sticks to the criterion of convergence to establish
similarity or approximation between different physical quantities, one will
conclude that the values of the quantities of statistical mechanics do not
approximate the values of thermodynamic quantities. As a consequence, and
in agreement with Batterman (2011), one would claim that limiting reduction
fails for the case of continuous phase transitions.
But, what forces us to understand approximation only in terms of con-
vergence towards a certain limit? Imagine that we could delimitate a region
in the neighborhood of a fixed point p∗, as illustrated in Figure 4. Imagine
further that we could show that the RG trajectory D generated by a finite
system s intersects the region U around the fixed point p∗, after a large
but finite number of iterations. Finally, imagine that linearizing around a
point d′ of the trajectory D which resides inside the region U allows us to
calculate, at least approximately, the experimental values of the critical ex-
ponents. Could we say, then, that we have succeeded in deriving, at least
approximately, the experimental values of the physical quantities from fi-
nite statistical mechanics? I think we could. Let me now show that this is
actually the case.
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Figure 4: The region around the fixed point p∗ represents neighboring
points.
Wilson and Kogut (1974, Sec. 12) demonstrated by using ε-expansion
approximation that in principle, and for an idealized case, if one starts from
a point which is close enough to the critical surface, the RG trajectory will
move close to the critical trajectory until it reaches the vicinity of a non-
trivial fixed point p∗.15 Once the trajectory reaches the neighborhood U of
the fixed point p∗ will stay there for a long time (which means, for repeated
iterations of the RG transformation), thereby acting as it were a fixed-point.
Finally, as n→∞, the trajectory will eventually move away from that region
approaching a trivial fixed point.
What is relevant for us is that within the neighborhood U of the fixed
point linearization is indeed possible, which implies that from a finite system
one can obtain the values of the critical exponents after a finite number of
iterations of the RG transformation. In order to derive accurate values of
15The ε-expansion is an asymptotic expansion for which ε takes values from ε = 1 to
ε << 1. Since the exponents are not analytic at ε = 0 one faces convergence problems
which are treated by sophisticated summation methods that are nowadays under control.
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the critical exponents, the number of iterations of the RG transformations
should be large enough so that all details which are not universal, namely all
details specific to a model, are washed out. If the number of iterations is not
large enough the coupling constants will be sensitive to details of the model
and the calculations of critical exponents will not be accurate (For details
see also Le Bellac 1998).
If the ultimate goal of limiting reduction is to justify the fundamental the-
ory by showing that the relevant quantities display values that approximate
the values of the secondary theory, then, based on the previous argument, we
have good reason to say that the quantities that describe continuous phase
transitions in thermodynamics reduce to the quantities that describe the
same phenomena in statistical mechanics, at least in this idealized case.
The formal expression that describes reduction in this particular case is
as follows:
LR5: A physical quantity Q
SM in statistical mechanics reduces
asymptotically to the analogous quantity QTD in thermodynam-
ics, if for N sufficiently large:
∃n0 such that QSMN,n0 ≈ Q
TD,
where n0 corresponds to a finite range of iterations of the RG transfor-
mation. It should be noticed that the values of QSMN,n0 also approximate
limn→∞ limN→∞Q
SM , which represent the values of the given quantity after
taking both the thermodynamic limit and the infinite iteration limit.
One might object that the results obtained in this section rely too much
on an idealized case and that in actual practice things are more complicated.
Although it is true that in practice things are less straightforward, numerical
simulation gives an important support for what has been said here. Since
1976 there have been attempts to use the numerical Monte Carlo simulation
in the framework of renormalization group methods for the study of critical
exponents. The first contribution in this direction was made by Ma (1976),
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who suggested an application of real space RG methods that required the
calculation of the renormalized Hamiltonians. However, since calculating
the renormalized couplings accurately enough proved to be too difficult, this
approach did not succeed in determining the fixed point Hamiltonian with
significant precision. Pawley, Swendsen, and Wilson (1984) made further
progress in this direction by suggesting an approach based on expectation
values of the correlation functions that did not rely on the calculation of
renormalized Hamiltonians. Using this approach, they showed that for an
Ising square lattice with 64 number sites, the system approaches the behavior
of an infinite system after two iterations of a RG transformation. After more
iterations, however, the system was shown to depart from the expected results
flowing towards a trivial fixed point. A plausible explanation for this cross-
over was that after more iterations the correlation length became comparable
to the size of the system and finitary effects became relevant.16
One should bear in mind, however, that for some models the convergence
is not as rapid as for the 2D-Ising lattice. Therefore, in order to avoid finite
size effects in the renormalized systems, one should use large lattices. In the
past years there has been significant improvement in this direction. See, for
example, Hsiao and Monceau (2002) and Itakura (2003).
2.6 Concluding Remarks
The arguments presented in this paper give us good reason to think that
the appeal to the infinite limits in the theory of phase transitions does not
represent a challenge for reduction, at least not for limiting reduction. In
fact, contra what has been argued by Batterman (2001, 2009) and Morrison
(2012), these arguments suggest that the infinities and divergences character-
istic of the physics of phase transitions are not essential for giving an account
of the phenomena since from finite statistical mechanics one can recover the
16This is also pointed out by Butterfield (Butterfield, 2011, p. 69).
46
thermodynamic behavior of phase transitions even in the case of continuous
phase transitions, as it was shown in section 5.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that phase transitions are not incon-
sistent with other notions of reduction that have also been discussed in the
philosophical literature. Norton (2013), for instance, correctly points out
that the case of continuous phase transitions does not satisfy what he calls
“few-many reduction”, according to which there will be a reduction if the
behavior of a system with a few components can be used to explain the be-
havior of a system with a large number of them. The reason for this is that
continuous phase transitions are intrinsically fluctuation phenomena that can
only arise when N is sufficiently large.
Likewise, continuous phase transitions also seem to be at odds with the
kind of reductive explanation that requires the explanans to give us accu-
rate and detailed information about the microscopic causal mechanisms that
produce the phenomenon (e.g. Kaplan (2011)). As it has been pointed out
by Batterman (2002), Batterman and Rice (2014) and Morrison (2012), the
impossibility of giving such an account is related with the robustness of the
fixed point solutions under different choices of the initial conditions. This im-
plies that the critical behavior is largely independent of specific microscopic
details characterizing the different models and that the statistical mechani-
cal account of phase transitions does not give us complete information about
the microscopic mechanisms underlying the transitions. However, as it was
shown in the paper, these senses in which reduction ”fails” do not threat the
project of inter-theory reductionism in any relevant sense.
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Chapter 3
Had We But World Enough,
and Time... But We Don’t!
Justifying the Thermodynamic and Infinite-time Limits
in Statistical Mechanics
“The divergent series are the invention of the devil, and it is a
shame to base on them any demonstration whatsoever” [N. H.
Abel 1828]
3.1 Introduction
“Had we but world enough, and time” are the words with which Andrew
Marvell begins his passionate poem in which he tells his lover that things
would be different if they had infinite space and time. While neither the
number of particles in real systems nor the time of measurements are infinite,
it is common in statistical mechanics to take the number of particles and time
to infinity in order to recover the values of thermodynamic observables. These
are called the thermodynamic limit and the infinite-time limit, respectively.
This raises the following questions: What justifies the empirical adequacy of
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scientific models that involve infinite limits? And what is the justification
that we have for applying such a theory to finite systems? Sure enough,
there would be a straightforward justification for the limits if one could show
that, at least for the purpose of inferring the values of the thermodynamic
observables, the infinite case is rather similar to the finite case (contrary to
the situation described by Marvell!). But, is this so?
As it was seen in the previous chapter, there has been a fervent contro-
versy around the use of the thermodynamic limit in the statistical mechanical
treatment of phase transitions, in which has been claimed by some authors
(e.g. Batterman 2005, Jones 2006, Batterman 2011, Bangu 2009, Bangu
2011) that the use of the thermodynamic limit – and so of an infinite system
– is indispensable to give an account of phase transitions. As a consequence,
it has been said that the behavior in the limit is physically real (Batterman
2005) or that phase transitions are not reducible to statistical mechanics
(e.g. Batterman 2011, Bangu 2011, Morrison 2012). Others (e.g. Butterfield
2011, Butterfield and Buoatta 2011, Norton 2012) have argued against these
conclusions saying that the thermodynamic limit can be justified straightfor-
wardly, because the thermodynamic limit gives an approximate description
of the behavior of real systems. They generally arrive at that conclusion by
saying that the thermodynamic limit satisfies what Landsman (2013) calls
Butterfield’s principle, according to which a limit is justified and can be re-
garded as mathematically convenient and empirically adequate if the same
behavior that arises in the limit also arises, at least approximately, “on the
way to the limit”.
In this chapter, I will take the side of the ones that believe that there
is a straightforward justification for the thermodynamic limit, but I will ar-
gue against the idea that the so-called “Butterfield Principle” is sufficient to
give a straightforward justification for the use of infinite limits in general. I
arrive at that conclusion by comparing the use of the thermodynamic limit
in the theory of phase transitions with the infinite-time limit in the expla-
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nation of equilibrium states, which has generally been left aside from the
recent philosophical debate around the use of infinite idealizations in statis-
tical mechanics. In the case of phase transitions, I will argue (Section 3.2)
that the thermodynamic limit can be justified pragmatically, since the limit
behavior also arises before we get to the limit and for a number of particles
N that is physically significant. However, I will contend (Section 3.3) that
the justification of the infinite-time limit is less straightforward. In fact, I
will point out that even in cases where one can recover the limit behavior for
finite time t, i.e. before we get to the limit, one fails to recover this behavior
for realistic time scales. In my view this leads us to reconsider the role that
the rate of convergence plays in the justification of infinite limits in general
and calls for a revision of the so-called Butterfield’s principle. I will end
this paper (Section 4.4) by offering a criterion for the justification of infinite
limits based on the notion of controllable approximations.
3.2 The Thermodynamic Limit in the Theory
of Phase Transitions
In recent years, phase transitions have captured the attention of philosophers
of science mainly because there seems to be an eliminable appeal to the ther-
modynamic limit in the statistical mechanical treatment of these phenomena.
In this section, I will explain the apparent need for the thermodynamic limit
and I will argue – in the same vein as Butterfield (2011)– that, despite some
claims about the “singular nature” of the thermodynamic limit, this ideal-
ization can be justified pragmatically.1
1Since the goal here is to relate the problem of the thermodynamic limit in the theory
of phase transitions with the infinite-time limit in the explanation of equilibrium, I will be
deliberately brief in my exposition of the problem of phase transitions. A more detailed
treatment of these topics can be found in the previous chapter as well as in Kadanoff
(2009), Butterfield (2011), Batterman (2001), and Butterfield and Buoatta (2011).
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3.2.1 The Problem of Phase Transitions
In thermodynamics, phases correspond to regions of the parameter space
where the values of the parameters uniquely specify equilibrium states. Phase
boundaries, in contrast, correspond to values of parameters at which two
different equilibrium states can coexist. The coexistence of different equi-
librium states at phase boundaries expresses itself as discontinuities of ther-
modynamic quantities, which are related to the first derivatives of the free
energy with respect to a parameter such as pressure or temperature. If the
system intersects a phase boundary when going from one phase to another,
i.e., encounters a discontinuity in a macroscopic observable, the system is
said to undergo a first-order phase transition. If the system moves from one
phase to another without intersecting a phase boundary, the system is said
to undergo a continuous phase transition, in which case there are no discon-
tinuities involved in the macroscopic observables, but there are divergences
in the second derivatives of the free energy.
In the statistical mechanical treatment of phase transitions, which is gen-
erally constructed on the basis of Gibbs’ canonical ensembles, one can de-
scribe phase transitions in terms of discontinuities or divergencies of the free
energy by invoking the thermodynamic limit. However, it appears that one
cannot do so without the infinite limit. In fact, in the canonical ensemble,
the free energy is defined as the logarithm of the partition function Z:
F = −kBT lnZ, (3.1)
where kB is the Boltzmannian constant. The partition function is the sum
over all states accessible to the system:
Z =
∑
i
eβHi , (3.2)
where β = 1
kbT
and Hi is the Hamiltonian associated to a particular mi-
crostate i. Since the Hamiltonian is usually a non-singular function of the
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degrees of freedom, it follows that the partition function is a sum of analytic
functions. As a consequence, neither the free energy nor its derivatives can
have the singularities that characterize phase transitions in thermodynam-
ics. Taking the thermodynamic limit, which consists of letting the number of
particles and the volume of the system go to infinity, i.e., N →∞, V →∞,
in such a way that N/V remains constant, allows one to recover those singu-
larities and provide a rigorous definition for the phenomena that turns out
to be empirically adequate.
Since we assume that real systems have a finite number of degrees of free-
dom, the question that arises is how can one justify the empirical adequacy
of the statistical mechanical treatment of phase transitions, notwithstanding
the fact that we know that it relies on an infinite idealization. One might
think that what explains the success of the theory is that it provides us with
a mathematical model that approximates the behavior of finite systems. Fol-
lowing this line of reasoning, one might assume that the quantities that suc-
cessfully describe phase transitions in the thermodynamic limit (in this case,
the derivatives of the free energy) approximate the values of the quantities
before we get to the limit, i.e. for finite and large N , and, moreover, that
they do so for realistic values of N . If this were actually the case, one would
have good reason to conclude that the justification for both the success of
the theory and the infinite idealization are straightforward. Moreover, we
would have good reason to justify the use of the limit as mathematically
convenient and empirically adequate, which is what Butterfield (2011) calls
“a straightforward justification of the limit”.
Unfortunately, the previous reasoning faces at least three difficulties that
prevent us from arriving at that conclusion as quickly as we would expect.
1. The first difficulty, pointed out most notably by Batterman in a series
of papers (2002, 2005, 2011), concerns the so-called “singular nature”
of the thermodynamic limit. According to Batterman, a limit is singu-
lar “if the behavior in the limit is of a fundamentally different character
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than the nearby solutions one obtains as ε → 0” (2005, p. 2), where
ε → 0 is taken as the “limiting behavior”. Batterman argues that the
thermodynamic limit is singular in the previous sense because even if
we take N to be arbitrarily large, as long as it is finite, the derivatives
of the free energy will never display a singularity. It is important to
note that he arrives at that conclusion by assuming that the singular
behavior of a quantity is qualitatively different from its analytic be-
havior. As will be seen in the next section, this assumption is far from
trivial.
2. The second difficulty regards the apparently essential role of the ther-
modynamic limit in the renormalization group approach. In order to
give an account of the quantitative behavior of continuous phase tran-
sitions, it was necessary to incorporate renormalization group (RG)
techniques. These techniques rely on the existence of non-trivial fixed
points, which are points in a space of Hamiltonians at which different
renormalization trajectories arrive after repeated iterations of a renor-
malization group transformation (details elsewhere, e.g, in Goldenfeld
1992, Wilson and Kogut 1974). It has been claimed (Batterman 2011,
Morrison 2012) that the thermodynamic limit is “ineliminable” in this
approach, because no matter how large we take N to be, as long as it is
finite, the RG trajectory will not converge towards a non-trivial fixed
point. This is supposed to follow from the fact that finite systems can-
not display a divergence in the correlation length and therefore cannot
present a loss in the characteristic length scale, which is necessary to
define non-trivial fixed points in the space of Hamiltonians.
3. The third difficulty is the problem of generality. Even if we could show
that in some cases the values of the quantities that successfully describe
phase transitions in the limit “N =∞” approximate the values of the
quantities evaluated for large but finite N , there remains the question
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of whether this is so in all cases in which the thermodynamic limit is
used to describe the phenomena of phase transitions. Landsman (2013)
argues, for instance, that for the case of quantum systems displaying
spontaneous symmetry breaking and the classical limit h̄→ 0 of quan-
tum mechanics, the situation is different and much more challenging
than in classical phase transitions.
3.2.2 Butterfield’s Principle and Butterfield’s Solution
to the Problem of Phase Transitions
The difficulties mentioned in the previous section have motivated controver-
sial claims. For instance, it has been argued that the need for the ther-
modynamic limit in the theory of phase transitions and, especially, in the
theory of continuous phase transitions imply the failure of the reduction of
thermodynamics to statistical mechanics (Batterman 2011, Morrison 2012,
Bangu 2009). Moreover, it has been argued that as a consequence of the
“singular” nature of the thermodynamic limit, one should conclude that the
singularities that describe phase transitions in the limit are physically real
(Batterman 2005).
Independently of whether these conclusions actually follow from the prob-
lems pointed out above, the fact is that, in light of those difficulties, the em-
pirical adequacy of the theory of phase transitions appears as conceptually
puzzling and requires an explanation.
So the question is: can we restore a straightforward justification for the
thermodynamic limit in the theory of phase transitions despite the objections
mentioned above? Butterfield (2011) actually argued that we can. Accord-
ing to him, the thermodynamic limit is justified and can be conceived as
mathematically convenient and empirically adequate because
there is a weaker, yet still vivid, novel and robust behaviour that
occurs before we get to the limit, i.e., for finite N. And it is this
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weaker behaviour which is physically real. (p. 1065)
Here “novel and robust” represents the behavior that is novel and robust
with respect to the behavior of systems with finite N : in the case of phase
transitions that is the discontinuities and singularities in the derivatives of the
free energy. And the word “weak ” is meant to emphasize that the behavior
that arises before one gets to the limit only approximates the behavior that
is observed in the limit. In other words, Butterfield thinks that the limit is
justified because the value of the relevant quantities before we get to the limit
is close to the value of the corresponding quantities evaluated at the limit.
In order to support his view, he presents a series of examples to show that
the “qualitative” difference between the behavior of the relevant quantities in
the limit and close to the limit is only apparent, since it is the consequence of
focusing on the wrong quantities. Let me summarize his argument. Consider
a sequence of functions:
gN(x) =

−1 if x ≤ −1/N
Nx if − 1/N ≤ x ≤ 1/N)
1 if x ≥ 1/N
As N goes to infinity, the sequence converges pointwise to the discontin-
uous function:
g∞(x) =

−1 if x < 0
0 if x = 0
1 if x > 0
If one introduces another function f , such that
f =
1 if g is discontinuous0 if g is continuous
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then one will conclude that the value of f∞ at the limit N =∞ is fundamen-
tally different from the value when N arbitrarily large but finite: f∞ 6≈ fN .
Consequently we will conclude that the thermodynamic limit is “singular” in
Batterman’s sense. However, if one looks at the behavior of the function g,
one will see that the limit value of the function is approached smoothly and
therefore that the limit system is not “singular” in the previous sense. Thus,
if one looks only at the quantity f , one will not be able to see what is revealed
when one looks at the behavior of the quantity g, namely that the limit is ac-
tually an approximate description of the behavior before we get to the limit.
According to Butterfield, this is exactly what happens with classical phase
transitions, and, for typical examples of phase transitions, he seems right.
Consider the paramagnetic–ferromagnetic transition in magnetic materials.
This transition is characterized by the divergence of a second derivative of
the free energy - the magnetic susceptibility χ - at the critical point. If we
introduce a quantity that represents the divergence of the magnetic suscep-
tibility and attribute a value 1 if the magnetic susceptibility diverges and 0
if it does not (analogous to the function f in Butterfield’s example), then we
might conclude that the limit quantities have values that are considerably
different from the values of the quantities for arbitrarily large but finite N .
However, if we focus on the behavior of a different property, namely the mag-
netic susceptibility itself χ, we will arrive at a different conclusion. In fact,
the magnetic susceptibility χ is defined as the derivative of the magnetization
with respect to an external magnetic field χ = ∂M/∂H. As N grows, the
change in the magnetization becomes steeper and steeper, and the quantity
smoothly approaches a divergence in the limit (analogous to the function
g). This means that in statistical mechanics one can, in principle, find finite
systems that have values of the magnetic susceptibility χ that approximate
the thermodynamic behavior.
I take it as a moral of Butterfield’s argument that the “singular” nature
of a limit is not in conflict with a straightforward justification of the limit.
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However, one needs to recognize that this only solves the first of the prob-
lems pointed out above and does not allow us to conclude that the same
argument applies to other cases of phase transitions (problem (iii)), or to
explain the role of the thermodynamic limit in renormalization group tech-
niques (problem (ii)). This last problem was studied extensively in the first
chapter and has been addressed also, for example, by Batterman 2011, Morri-
son 2012, Norton 2012 and Butterfield himself (Butterfield 2011, Butterfield
and Buoatta 2011). Since I do not have space to discuss these other issues
here, I will restrict my analysis to the cases in which numerical values for
finite systems are available: the paramagnetic-ferromagnetic transition de-
scribed above and the liquid-vapor transition at the critical point in which
the compressibility behaves analogously to the magnetic susceptibility. The
question that I want to raise here instead is whether, in order to justify the
use of the thermodynamic limit, it is sufficient to show that the behavior
of finite systems before we get to the limit (for large N) approximates the
behavior in the limit, as Butterfield’s principle prescribes. Moreover, I wish
to discuss whether this can be used as a general principle for justifying the
use of infinite limits in physics.
Although Butterfield (2011) does not consider this criterion as a general
principle (at least not explicitly), Landsman (2012) does:
Butterfield’s Principle is the claim that in this and similar situ-
ations, where it has been argued (by other authors) that certain
properties emerge strictly in some idealisation (and hence have
no counterpart in any part of the lower-level theory), “there is
a weaker, yet still vivid, novel and robust behaviour [...] that
occurs before we get to the limit, i.e., for finite N. And it is this
weaker behaviour which is physically real.” (p. 383)
Likewise, Norton (2012) also seems to take this as a criterion when he suggests
that most of the controversy around phase transitions is dissolved after one
recognizes that this theory does not require idealizations (i.e. systems that
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provide inexact descriptions of the target system) but only approximations
(i.e. inexact description of the target system) of the behavior of systems
with very large number of particles. It is important to note, however, that
if one wants to transform Butterfield’s criterion into a principle, one needs
to show not only that this criterion is necessary for giving a straightforward
justification of infinite idealizations (which seems hard to deny), but also
sufficient. In this respect, it is surprising that little attention has been given
to the rate of convergence in the justification of infinite limits.
More to the point, if we assume that the limit is justified when we can
prove that the idealized mathematical model is just an approximation of the
behavior of realistic systems, it does not suffice to show that the behavior
of phase transitions can be recovered for large but finite N , but it must also
be shown that it is recovered for values of N that are physically significant,
i.e. for N ≈ 1023. In the examples discussed here, it turns out that this
is actually the case. For instance, the value of the magnetic susceptibility
χN for N ≈ 1023 is approximately the same as the limit value limN→∞ χN .
Therefore, one can be confident that the idealized model for phase transitions
is a good approximation of realistic systems. Butterfield (2011, p. 19) points
this out, but he does not emphasize the importance of demonstrating that
the infinite limit also provides a good approximation for realistic values of
N , nor he includes this explicitly as a condition for the justification of the
limit. Sure enough, in the examples of phase transitions he refers to, the
values of the quantities for realistic N are so close to the values obtained in
the neighborhood of the limit that distinguishing between such values does
not seem to be crucial. However, this is not necessarily the case in other
examples of infinite limits. Indeed, we will see next that in the infinite-time
limit the values of the relevant quantities for very large but finite time can
vary significantly from the values obtained for realistic t.
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3.3 The Infinite-time Limit in the Ergodic
Explanation of Equilibrium
The infinite-time limit, which consists in letting time go to infinity t → ∞,
has played an important role in statistical mechanics and, like the ther-
modynamic limit, has also been matter of controversy in the philosophical
literature (e.g. Malament and Zabell 1980, Earman and Rédei 1996, Emch
and Liu 2013, Sklar 1995).
In this section, I will first discuss the role of the infinite-time limit in
the explanation of equilibrium in Gibbsian statistical mechanics and I will
then expose the difficulties for giving a straightforward justification of the
limit. Contrary to the case of the thermodynamic limit in the theory of phase
transitions, I will argue that these difficulties are not related to whether or
not one can recover the limit values of the relevant quantities for finite t,
i.e. before we get to the limit, but rather to whether or not one can recover
those values for realistic t. This will reveal the important role of the rate of
convergence in the justification of infinite limits.
3.3.1 The Problem of the Infinite-Time Limit
In order to understand the use of the infinite-time limit in the Gibbs’ frame-
work, one needs to become familiar with the Gibbs formalism. The most
important concept here is the notion of ensemble, defined as an infinite collec-
tion of systems governed by the same Hamiltonian but distributed differently
over the phase space Γ. An ensemble can also be understood as a uniform
probability distribution ρ over Γ, which reflects the probability of finding the
state of a system in a certain region of Γ. The uniform probability distribu-
tion on an hypersurface ΓE of this space Γ is referred to as the microcanonical
ensemble, where the energy and the number of particles are constant. In the
microcanonical ensemble, there is a phase function fp : ΓE → IR associ-
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ated with each relevant physical quantity. The expectation values of those
functions will correspond to phase averages, defined as follows:
〈f〉p =
∫
ΓE
fpρ dΓE (3.3)
Phase averages play an important role in this approach because they cor-
respond to the values of the macroscopic quantities measured in experiments.
In fact, if we measure the macroscopic quantities of a gas in equilibrium which
is enclosed in some container, we will observe that these values coincide with
the values predicted by Gibbs’ phase averages, even if we do not have any
information about the microscopic configuration of the gas.
The question that has puzzled physicists and philosophers of science is
why phase averages coincide with values measured in real physical systems.
The answer is not clear. First of all, this formalism is built upon the notion
of ensemble, which is a fictional entity that does not make direct reference
to the behavior of a single system. Second, phase averages do not tell us
anything about the dynamics, i.e. they do not give us information about
how the the system – at the microscopic level – behaves in time. Third, this
formalism does not explain why the experimental values always correspond
to the average values and are not spread around the mean.2
The most intuitive explanation for the success of phase averages consists
of associating them with time averages 〈f〉t. Time averages have a clearer
physical meaning because they make reference to the fraction of time that the
system spends in the regions of the phase space associated to the mean values
of the macroscopic observables. In other words, if we assume that measure-
ments take some time, then we might think that we succeed in measuring
phase averages because they correspond to the average values that actually
occur during the time of measurement. And here is when the infinite-time
limit comes into scene. In order to associate phase averages with time aver-
2See Frigg 2008, Uffink 2007 and van Lith 2001 for a more detailed description of the
problems associated with the Gibbs formalism.
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ages, one generally needs to introduce the infinite-time limit. For example,
the Birkhoff theorem tells us that if we define the invariant mean of time 〈f〉t
of time dependent functions f(t) as
〈f〉t = lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
f(t) dt, (3.4)
it follows that for almost all sets (except on a set with measure zero):
1. 〈f〉t exists for every integrable function f(t) in ΓE.
2. If the system is ergodic, then 〈f〉p = 〈f〉t.
Note that in this approach, in order to derive the equivalence between
phase averages and time averages 〈f〉p = 〈f〉t, one needs to assume that the
system is ergodic, which means that as time evolves the dynamic trajectories
pass through every point in ΓE.
3 The assumption of ergodicity has been
itself a matter of controversy in the foundations of statistical mechanics, but
for the sake of brevity I will leave this discussion aside and focus instead on
the appeal to the infinite-time limit for the justification of equilibrium.
The introduction of the infinite-time limit in the definition of time aver-
ages is far from trivial, especially if one thinks that the original motivation for
relating phase averages with time averages is the belief that the latter have a
clearer physical meaning. In fact, we know that measurements do not take an
infinite amount of time: so, what is that justifies the use of the infinite-time
limit in this context? One might try to give a straightforward justification
for the limit along the lines of Butterfield’s principle by saying that even if
the measurement times are short with respect to human macroscopic scales,
they are very long with respect to the microscopic time scales, i.e. time of
3Strictly speaking, this theorem was formulated in terms of metric transitivity instead
of ergodicity. Metric transitivity is a property of dynamical systems that captures the same
idea as ergodicity but in measure theoretic sense. For more details see Uffink 2007[sec.6],
van Lith 2001[ch. 7]
61
collision between particles, and therefore they are well approximated by in-
finite time averages (One can find arguments in this direction, for example,
in Gallavotti 1999, Emch and Liu 2013). If so, one might think that one has
good reason to consider the infinite-time average as a mathematical model
that approximate the values obtained in finite time measurements and will
have good reason to give a pragmatic justification for it. For example, that
it allows us to wash out fluctuations we deem irrelevant, that it is mathemat-
ically convenient and that it allows us not having to decide in advance how
long the time of measurement should be. Unfortunately, there are difficulties
that prevent us from arriving at this conclusion as quickly as we would like.
1. The first is that even if the limit defined in (4) exists, it does not mean
necessarily that it describes a system in equilibrium. Uffink (2007, p.
92) expresses this difficulty pointing out that generally:
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
f(t) dt 6= lim
t→∞
f(t), (3.5)
where the right-hand side describes a constant value of a physical quan-
tity f(t) and the left-hand side represents an average value of the same
quantity. Note that for periodical motions the left-hand side exists
whereas the right-hand side does not.
2. Second, there is a problem related to the apparent indispensability of
the infinite limit in the derivation of the equivalence between phase
and time averages (this problem is similar but not equivalent to the
problem of “singular” limits discussed above in the context of the ther-
modynamic limit). We saw that Birkhoff’s theorem states that one
can derive the equivalence between phase averages and time averages
after taking the infinite time limit, but this theorem does not tell us
anything about how these two averages are related for large but finite
times. Frigg expresses this point as follows: “... the infinity is crucial.
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If we replace infinite time averages by finite ones (no matter how long
the relevant period is taken to be), then the ergodic theorem does not
hold any more and the explanation is false.” (2008, p. 147)
3. Finally, there is the difficulty that even if one can show that the limit
in (4) converges, this does not imply that it converges rapidly enough
to be empirically meaningful. Measurement times generally take a very
short time with respect to human macroscopic time scales. Thus, in
order to show that the infinite time average is a good approximation for
finite time averages, one needs to prove that the infinite time average
is approached within realistic measurement time scales.
In the reminder of this paper, I will focus mainly on problem (iii), because
it is this problem that reveals the most important difference between the
thermodynamic limit discussed in Section 2 and the infinite-time limit.
3.3.2 The Dog-Flea Model and a Straightforward Jus-
tification for the Infinite-Time Limit
In order to understand under which conditions one could give a straight-
forward justification for the infinite-time limit it is useful to consider a toy
model. The toy model that can best help us to grasp these conditions is the
Dog-Flea model, invented by Tatjana Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa and Paul Ehren-
fest (Ehrenfest and Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa 1907). A version of the model is
as follows. Consider two dogs, Poomba and Woori, that share a population
of N fleas. Assume further that N is even and that the fleas are labeled
by an index from 1 to N . The macroscopic observables of the model are n
and m, representing the number of fleas in Poomba and Woori, respectively.
A microscopic description of the system corresponds to the specification of
the positions of all fleas in each dog. The time evolution of the system is
described like this: At every second, a number from 1 to N is taken randomly
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from a bag and announced. When hearing its name, the corresponding flea
jumps immediately from the dog it pestered to the other. The model predicts
that in the long run (t → ∞), and independently of the initial distribution,
the process leads to a time-invariant distribution that is symmetric around
the value p = N/2 and it is very peaked at that value, all the more so when
N is large. It is important to emphasize that the model admits only one
time-invariant probability distribution, which is the same as the distribution
in classical probability theory that in a sequence of N trials of a fair coin,
exactly p heads come up. In this way, the model illustrates quite nicely that
under certain statistical assumptions, it is possible to obtain the properties
that characterize equilibrium. And, analogously to the case described above,
the equilibrium distribution is defined in the limit t→∞.
Following the strategy used in the previous section, we might think that
the asymptotic distribution will approximate the behavior of a finite time
measurement if the measurement time (macroscopic time scale) is very long
with respect to the time that it takes for a flea to jump from one dog to the
other (microscopic time scale), which is here one second. If this is the case,
we might also say that the infinite-time limit is justified pragmatically, since
it is mathematically convenient and it enables us to wash out fluctuations.
An advantage of the Dog-Flea model is that it allows us to perform com-
puter simulations to test our hypothesis. Emch and Liu (2013, sec. 3.4)
present the results of these simulations for two different time scales:
1. The first run consists of 102 iterations.
2. The second run consists of 104 iterations.
In both cases, the number of fleas is N = 100. Remarkably, even if the two
macroscopic time scales are long with respect to the microscopic scale (a
single iteration), the results for (a) are significantly different from the results
obtained for (b). Whereas (a) exhibits values of n, m that are constantly
changing, (b) exhibits equilibrium behavior (with chaotic fluctuations) that
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is in good agreement with the equilibrium distribution obtained in the infinite
time limit.
Based on these results, we should conclude that the time invariant dis-
tribution (for t → ∞) gives us a good approximation for the values of the
macroscopic observables in (b) but not in (a). Accordingly, we can say that
we are justified in using the limit distribution for describing the situation for
(b), but not for (a). Note, that this justification is not related with whether
or not the system approaches the equilibrium values in a finite time, but
rather with whether or not the system approaches those values in a time
that is short with respect to the time of measurement. This obliges us to
consider the convergence rate, which represents the rapidity at which the
limit is reached. In the first case (a), the convergence is not rapid enough.
Indeed, the system will eventually approach equilibrium, in a long but finite
time, but since this time is much longer than the measurement time, the
average values of the observables will not coincide with the values predicted
by the time invariant distribution. Therefore, the asymptotic average value
will not provide a good approximation of the values measured during that
time.
3.3.3 The Importance of the Rate of Convergence
For the present discussion, the important lesson of the Dog-Flea model is
that talking about “long time” is useless unless we specify the relevant time
scales of the problem under investigation. In this sense, if we want to justify
the infinite-time limit in the explanation of equilibrium, it does not suffice
to argue that the time of measurement is “very long” with respect to micro-
scopic time scales, but rather we need to specify the rate of convergence and
guarantee that the asymptotic value will be reached within the time scales
that we are interested in. As one might suspect, specifying the convergence
rate is not a trivial task. To give a more precise idea, let 〈f(T )〉 represent
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the average value calculated at time T , that is:
〈f(T )〉 = 1
T
∫ T
0
f(Tt)dt. (3.6)
Then in order to determine the convergence rate, one needs to find a finite
ε(T ) such that:
||〈f(T )〉 − 〈f〉t|| ≤ ε(T ), (3.7)
where 〈f〉t is the time invariant mean defined in (4). Even in simple mod-
els, to obtain definite values of ε(T ) is often difficult in both theory and
practice, and to demonstrate that this value is very small, i.e, ε(T ) ≈ 0, for
realistic measurement times is even harder. More importantly, it is perfectly
conceivable to have a situation in which the values of the functions are con-
stantly changing so that the time needed to attain the time average is of
the order of the recurrence time, i.e. the time necessary to visit the entire
surface ΓE. One can estimate that the recurrence time for a small sample
of diluted hydrogen gas is unimaginably longer than the age of the universe,
and this time is even longer if we consider more complicated systems. In
situations like this, there might well exist a finite ε(T ) that satisfies eq.(7).
However, the time for which ε is sufficiently small will be much longer than
realistic measurement times, which means that for realistic time scales T ′,
say 2/10 sec., 〈f(T ′)〉 6≈ 〈f〉t.4
The previous argument just tells us that, even if we could demonstrate
that the asymptotic average will be reached within finite but very large times
(or in other words “on the way to the limit” as in Butterfield’s principle),
this does not imply that the asymptotic average will be reached for realistic
t and, therefore, it does not imply that we can interpret the limit as giving
us a good approximation of the systems that we are interested in. This has
an important philosophical consequence because it tells us that the so-called
“Butterfield’s principle” is not sufficient to justify the limit in this case.
4For a quantitative estimation, see Gallavotti 1998
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Boltzmann himself was aware of the problem of the rate of convergence in
the justification of the infinite-time limit, and in order to reconcile this limit
with the rapid approach to equilibrium, assumed that the “the macroscopic
observables, had an essentially constant value on the surface of given energy
with the exception of an extremely small fraction ε of cells” (1874 [quoted
in Gallavotti 1999, p. 16]). Unfortunately, this assumption is not uncon-
troversial, and to some extent it does not really solve the problem. In fact,
even if we accept the premise postulating, for example, that the functions
satisfy symmetry conditions, we still need an argument to associate phase
averages with time averages. In other words, we still need an argument that
allows us to conclude that the system does not spend so much time in the
small fraction of cells that differ from the mean phase values. Ironically, this
seems to beg the question, in that it brings us back to the original problem
for which the infinite time limit entered the picture, namely the problem of
deriving the equivalence between phase and time averages.
Different alternatives have been offered in the literature to deal with this
and the other problems associated with infinite time averages. Maybe the
most radical was the proposal by Malament and Zabell (1980), where they
argue that one can explain the empirical adequacy of phase averages without
appealing to time averages at all. Their argument is based on two assump-
tions: i) the system exhibits small dispersion with respect to the phase av-
erage (analogously to Boltzmann’s assumption), and ii) the microcanonical
measure represents the probability of finding a system in a particular region
of the phase space. According to them, these two assumptions taken together
lead to the conclusion that the probability that phase functions are always
close to their phase averages is very large, without making any reference to
infinite time averages. Even if this view looks appealing, two main criticisms
have been raised in the literature. The first is that in order to justify assump-
tion (ii), they invoke a version of ergodicity, which is an hypothesis that has
been questioned in the foundations of statistical mechanics (e.g. Earman and
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Redei 1998, Frigg 2008, van Lith 2001). The second, which is more important
for us, is that they justify assumption (i) based on Khinchin-Lanford disper-
sion theorems, which tell us that for functions that satisfy strong symmetry
conditions, the dispersions from the mean will go to 0 in the thermodynamic
limit. The appeal to the thermodynamic limit would not be problematic, if
we could demonstrate that – like the case of phase transitions – there is a
straightforward justification for it. Unfortunately, the use of the thermody-
namic limit in this context appears to be less straightforward than in the
case of phase transitions, because Butterfield’s principle is not enough to
justify the limit. In fact, for realistic N ≈ 1023, one can estimate, based on
Khinchin’s theorem, that the probability that there is a relative deviation
from the mean of more than a tiny ε is very small, but not sufficiently small
to discard that these states will occur in nature. This means that one cannot
regard (at least not without risks) the asymptotic results obtained in this
and other similar theorems as providing us with a good approximation of the
behavior of realistic systems. This problem is also referred in the literature
as the measure-epsilon problem (See Uffink 2007, van Lith 2001 and Frigg
2008).
An alternative approach can be found in Earman and Redei (1996). They
do not invoke ergodicity for the explanation of the success of phase averages,
but they are quite sympathetic towards the explanatory role of “ergodic-like
behavior”. According to them, ergodic-like behavior only requires weak mix-
ing behavior with respect to a set of finite observables. It is important to
note that the definition of mixing offered by them still requires the appeal
to the infinite-time limit. Interestingly for what we are discussing here, they
explicitly include rapid convergence as an additional condition for the expla-
nation of equilibrium. To justify this assumption they suggest (although not
necessarily endorse) two possible routes: a) The first is to make reference
to matter-of-fact initial states. b) The second is to assume that systems
are subjected to perturbations from outside that act as a kind of ‘stirring’
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mechanism which rapidly drive the observed values of the macroscopic quan-
tities.5 Even if one should not discard that some progress can be done in
each of these lines of research, one should recognize that they are method-
ologically complicated since they oblige us to the consider specific features
of the systems of interest.
The explanation of the empirical success of phase averages is still an open
problem in the foundations of statistical mechanics. Although there is some
skepticism in the philosophical literature towards the idea of explaining this
success via infinite time averages, the infinite-time limit continues playing an
important role in physics. It is far beyond the scope of this paper to offer a
final assessment for the appeal to the infinite-time limit in the explanation of
equilibrium. However, it suffices for our purposes to have shown that much
of the problems for providing a justification for such a limit come from the
conceptual and methodological difficulties to specify the rapidity at which
the limit is approached. I argued that this has an important consequence for
the current philosophical literature on infinite limits, because it teaches us
an important lesson about the role of the convergence rate in the justification
of infinite limits.
3.4 Conclusion: Infinite Limits as Control-
lable Approximations
Although there is no consensus regarding the status of infinite limits in
physics, it seems reasonable to interpret these idealizations as mathemati-
cal models that approximate the behavior of finite systems. The question
that one needs to ask, however, is under which conditions are we allowed
to arrive at that conclusion. In the debate on phase transitions, it is often
assumed that we are allowed to interpret the infinite limit as providing an
5A review of this attempts can be found in Lanford 1973
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approximation of finite systems as long as the behavior that arises in the
limit also arises, at least approximately, “on the way to the limit”, which is
what we called here the “ Butterfield principle”. However, in this paper I ar-
gued that in the case of the infinite-time limit this condition is not sufficient
to justify the limit. This is because in this case the values of the relevant
quantities “before we get to the limit”, that is for finite but very large t, can
take values significantly different from the values obtained for realistic time
scales t.
The above result leads us to a revision of Butterfield’s principle that
would apply more generally than the original formulation. A proposal is as
follows:
We can justify infinite limits, when x→∞, as being mathemat-
ical models that approximate the behavior of real finite systems,
iff (i) the behavior that arises in the limit also occurs, at least
approximately, before we get to the limit, i.e., for finite x., and
(ii) it also arises for realistic values of x.
A concept that captures the main idea of the previous statement is the
notion of controllable approximations. Emch and Liu (2002, p. 526) define
controllable approximations as the ones in which the deviations of the model
with respect to realistic systems can be quantitatively estimated. When no
such estimation can be given, the approximation is said to be uncontrollable.
Uffink (2007, p. 109) makes this notion more precise, suggesting that in the
case of controllable approximations involving infinite limits one has control
over how large the value of the parameter must be to assure that the infinite
limit is a reasonable substitute for a finite system. Since we are interested
in the behavior of realistic systems, I claim that this “control” should also
involve a specification of the rate of convergence. This will allow us to warrant
that the limit is reached for realistic values of the parameters and therefore
that it is a good approximation of the target systems. In the cases of phase
transitions analyzed in Section 3.2, the thermodynamic limit appears to be
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controllable in this sense. However, for what has been argued in Section 3.3,
we do not seem to be in the position of deriving the same conclusion for the
case of the infinite-time limit.
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Chapter 4
Market Crashes as Critical
Phase Transitions?
Reductive Explanations and Idealizations in Econophysics1
“Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful” [George
Box 1987]
4.1 Introduction
The success of formal methods to explain natural phenomena in physics
prompts the question of whether similar methods can be applied to explain
phenomena in social sciences. Or more specifically, whether the same math-
ematics employed in physics can be used to explain and predict phenomena
in economics and politics. There are reasons to think that this is possible.
In the last thirty years, a great number of models originally designed in the
context of statistical mechanics have been reinterpreted to recover certain
1Chapter based on the paper “Market Crashes as Critical Phenomena: Explanation,
Idealization, and Universality in Econophysics”, co-authored with Jennifer Jhun and James
O. Weatherall (Jhun, Palacios, and Weatherall in press)
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regularities in economics. Work in this tradition has come to be known
as econophysics, a term coined by H. Eugene Stanley in 1996. 2 In this
tradition, important models have tried to account for cooperative behavior
in economics using the physics of phase transitions. The idea of using the
physics of phase transitions to build models in social sciences is principally
motivated by the fact that phase transitions are the prototypical example of
cooperative phenomena, in which the correlations between particles extend to
very large distances, even though the microscopic interactions remain local.
There is, therefore, the thought that the physics that successfully explains
the first case will serve to explain the other analogous cases.
Despite the apparent empirical successes of some models in econophysics,
the field has not been widely embraced by economists. The few who have
engaged have been strongly critical. For example, Lo and Mueller. (2010)
have argued that econophysics is doomed because “human behavior is not
nearly as stable and predictable as physical phenomena” (1), and thus the
strategies available in physics are not at all suitable for dealing with economic
phenomena. 3 Our strategy will not be to address the general criticisms and
we do not mean to argue that all models from econophysics, or even most or
many models, are successful. Instead, we will focus on just one model that, we
will argue, has two features of interest: it (1) draws on a significant analogy
with phase transitions, in a way that goes beyond standard modeling methods
in economics; and (2) has real explanatory power. Our principal goal is to
elaborate and defend how we take the model to work, including where and
how the analogy with phase transitions enters, and to articulate what sorts of
novel insights into market behavior we believe it offers. In this sense, we take
the model we consider as “proof of concept”, while simultaneously providing
2For more on the relationship between physics, finance, and econophysics, see Weather-
all (2013); for further technical details and overviews of recent work, see Mantegna and
Eugene (1999), McCauley (2004), and Cottrell, P., G., Wright, and V. (2009).
3Despite the prevalence of this sort of criticism, it is far from clear that physics is more
guilty of oversimplification than economics when it is applied to economic facts.
73
a case-study for the sorts of explanatory goals that arise in econophysics.
The model that we evaluate is the Johansen-Ledoit-Sornette (JLS) model
of “critical” market crashes (Johansen, Ledoit, and Sornette 2000), which
uses methods from the theory of critical phase transitions in physics to pro-
vide a predictive framework for financial market crashes.4. This model is of
particular interest because it aims both to predict and describe market-level
phenomena – crashes – and to provide microscopic foundations that explain
how that behavior can result from interactions between individual agents.
More specifically, in addition to its predictive role, the JLS model aims to
explain two “stylized facts” associated market crashes. 5. The first is the
fact that stock market returns seem to exhibit power law behavior in the
vicinity of a crash, and the second is so-called volatility clustering, which is
the fact that market returns seem to exhibit dramatic, oscillating behavior
before crashes, with large changes followed by other large changes.6
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 4.2, we will present some
(limited) background on mainstream modeling in financial economics that
will help place the JLS model in context.7. In section 4.3, we will introduce
the model itself, focusing on the role the analogy with critical phase tran-
sitions plays in the model. Then, in section 4.4 we will argue against one
tempting way of understanding how the model works, and instead defend a
somewhat different understanding. On the view we will defend, the principal
achievements of the model are to explain why crashes occur endogenously in
markets and to provide a possibly predictive signature for impending crashes.
4For more on this model and related ideas, see especially Sornette, Woodard, Yan, and
Wei-Xing 2013 and references therein.
5These stylized facts are often treated as qualitative laws or as descriptions of lawlike
behavior, capturing “set[s] of properties, common across many instruments, markets, and
time periods” (Cont 2001, 223)
6This has also been noted by Mandelbrot (1963).
7For more on how the JLS model fits into mainstream financial modeling, see Sor-
nette (2003); for background on mathematical methods in finance more generally, see for
instance, Joshi (2008)
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Central to our argument in section 4.4 will be the observation that al-
though the analogy with critical phase transitions is crucial in motivating and
developing the model, in the end the analogy is only partial. In particular,
although the model fruitfully draws on the renormalization group theory of
critical exponents, financial crashes do not seem to constitute a universality
class in the strict sense that one encounters in that area of physics. Nonethe-
less, we argue, there is a weaker sense in which crashes exhibit universal
features. This weaker notion of universality allows one to draw novel infer-
ences about the microscopic mechanisms that might underlie crashes. Since
the model helps make salient the possible microscopic mechanisms that could
explain the occurrence of a crash, we claim that the model provides an ex-
planation of crashes that is both causal (in the sense of Woodward 2003) and
reductive.
In section 5 of the paper, we will explore how the argument just sketched
relates to recent debates in philosophy of science concerning explanatory
uses of idealized models. We will argue that the JLS model is naturally
understood as a “minimal model” in the sense of Batterman and Rice 2014
(see also Batterman 2002; 2005; 2009). Nonetheless, we claim, (apparently)
contra Batterman and Rice, that it provides both a causal and reductive
explanation of market crashes. As we will argue, this shows that the same
mathematical methods may be used for multiple explanatory purposes, and
that to understand explanatory strategies in the context even of minimal
models, one needs to pay careful attention to the salient why questions.
We conclude with some remarks about possible policy consequences. In
particular, we argue that our interpretation of the JLS model as one that
yields causal explanations suggests methods by which policymakers could
intervene on the economy in order to prevent crashes or to halt the spread
of one. The JLS model, we argue, may be used as a diagnostic tool, allow-
ing economists and regulators to formulate new measures or to assess the
performance of ones are already in place.
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4.2 Some Financial and Economic Background
to the JLS Model
Although the JLS model draws extensively on methods and ideas from the
theory of critical phenomena in physics, it also builds on a long, mainstream
tradition of market modeling in financial economics. Moreover, Sornette and
collaborators emphasize this continuity with early work in financial modeling.
In the course of analyzing work in econophysics, it seems particularly impor-
tant to be clear about just where this work diverges from more traditional
modeling. And so in this section we will provide some minimal background
on methods and ideas from financial modeling that the JLS model builds on.
The JLS model may be broadly located in a tradition of modeling markets
as stochastic processes. This tradition originated with groundbreaking work
in 1900 by French mathematician Louis Bachelier, who first proposed treating
price changes as a random walk and built an options model on this basis
(Bachelier and Samuelson 2011). Bachelier’s work went largely unnoticed,
however, until re-discovered by J. L. Savage and Paul Samuelson in the early
1950s. Independently, in 1959 a physicist named M.F.M. Osborne proposed
modeling market returns as undergoing Brownian motion (Osborne 1959).
Osborne provided his own empirical support for this model, though it was
largely consistent with earlier empirical work on market time series by the
Cowles Commission (1933) and by Kendall (1953).
Later, Samuelson (1965) and Fama (1965) explicitly connected the random-
walk hypothesis to the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH). 8 The EMH is
8The EMH has been a topic of considerable controversy. For instance, Shiller (1984)
has argued that the argument behind the EMH is invalid. The main worry is that current
models neglect (i) agent psychology and (ii) interactions amongst agents as key causal and
explanatory features of asset price variations. Once these factors are considered, it seems
markets may well be random irrespective of how efficiently markets process information
or how accurately prices reflect fundamental values. Meanwhile, as Ball (2009) and others
have argued, over-reliance on the assumption of efficiency may affect how market partic-
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the claim that markets are informationally efficient and asset prices reflect
(all) available information. The EMH is consistent with, and indeed implies,
market randomness. This is because if markets are assumed to assimilate
information efficiently, then any information available to market participants
at a given time will already be factored into the price at that time.9 Thus
only (unaccounted for) news, which is random, changes prices, meaning that
changes in stock option prices themselves must be random. Persistent excep-
tions to this rule, it is argued, are impossible, since if traders were to observe
a pattern in asset price time series that could be exploited, they will exploit
it, which would tend to wash out the pattern.
More formally, in efficient markets prices follow a martingale process,
which is a general stochastic process where the conditional expectation of
the next value, given past history and current value, is precisely the current
value. That is,
E(pt+1 − pt|Ωt) = 0,
where Ωt = (p1, p2, ...pt), the history up till time t.
Here E(pt+1 − pt|Ωt) = 0, is the expectation value of the change in price
in a given time-step. Thus, for an asset that pays no dividends, one should
expect the future price to hover around the current value, all other things
being equal.
Et[p(t
′)] = p(t),
ipants synthesize information regarding possible asset bubbles. But we will not weigh in
on such controversies; our purpose here is not to endorse the EMH, but rather to describe
the context of the JLS model and to emphasize its continuity with mainstream economic
modeling methods.
9Note that this argument appears to suppose that news that will positively affect price
is equally likely as news that will negatively affect price. But if there were any information
available that would indicate that positive (resp. negative) news was more likely, then that
fact alone would count as tradeable information that would affect price.
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for all t′ > t. In other words, we could say that the prices of stocks do not
depart from their fundamental or intrinsic value in a way that an investor
could systematically predict or exploit to make a profit in the long run. In
this sense, the EMH implies that the market will behave unpredictably.
The market models just described have some well-known limitations. For
instance, if returns are modeled as a random walk, as Osborne and others
proposed, one would generally expect returns to be normally distributed. In
fact, however, market returns tend to be “fat-tailed”.10 This means that
we see extreme events more often than one would expect if returns were
normally distributed. In addition, treating markets as a martingale process
leaves out a number features that appear to be good indicators of crises,
such as volatility clustering (where large changes in price are followed by
further large changes in price). That said, neither the martingale condition
nor the EMH is in and of itself inconsistent with fat-tailed distributions or
with large asset price changes. Indeed, there is a tradition in economics of
modeling rational bubbles, which are deviations from fundamental values that
are compatible with the martingale condition and the EMH (Blanchard 1979;
Santos and Woodford 1997; Sornette and Malevergne 2001) The idea is that
under some circumstances markets enter a “speculative regime” in which it
is rational to hold onto an asset in anticipation of growing future returns,
even though one believes that the current price is not the fundamental price.
Here, markets may still be understood to be processing information efficiently
– and thus the EMH may be taken to hold – since the endogenous facts about
the speculative regime are themselves information bearing on future prices.
In this regime, an asset’s value grows indefinitely, which itself is not realistic
but may be a suitable modeling assumption if persistant increase in value
is anticipated over the timescale of interest. Still, rational bubbles models
of the sort just described provide no insight into the circumstances under
which the speculative regime ends and markets crash. The JLS model is
10See, for instance, Mandlebrot (1963) and Cont (2001).
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intended to extend rational bubbles models in order to explain and predict
market crashes in the speculative regime. The basic proposal is that financial
bubbles and subsequent crashes are much like the development of sudden,
spontaneous, and drastic behavior in physical systems such as magnets. Like
earlier rational bubbles models, the JLS model treats bubbles and crashes
without rejecting the EMH. Instead, as we will see in the next section, it
attempts to reconcile the EMH with a story about the behavior of interacting
traders.
4.3 The JLS model
Important stock market crashes of the twentieth century, including the US
crashes of 1929 and 1987 and the Hong-Kong crash of 1997, have been the re-
sult of the action of a large group of traders placing sell orders simultaneously.
Curiously, this synchronized “herding” behavior seems to arise endogenously,
rather than from outside instruction or the influence of communication me-
dia. Traders, who are geographically apart and generally disagree with each
other, seem to organize themselves to place the same order at the same time.
The JLS model concerns the character and dynamics of this self organization
between traders. 11
In physics, critical phase transitions constitute an important class of phe-
nomena that likewise exhibit “self organization”. A paradigm example of
these kinds of transitions is the paramagnetic-ferromagnetic transition in
magnetic materials. In this transition, a large group of spins that are gen-
erally pointing in different directions align themselves in the same direction
simultaneously, so that the system undergoes spontaneous magnetization.
This suggests a potentially useful analogy between critical phase transitions
11Note that we mean “self-organization” in the informal sense of coordinated action
between agents without any apparent external mechanism. We do not intend to invoke
any specific theories of self-organization or self-organized criticality.
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and stock market crashes.
Motivated by this analogy, Johansen et al (2000) propose a model (hence-
forth the JLS model) that elaborates on the rational bubbles models noted
in the previous section and other work in econophysics (eg. Sornette, Jo-
hansen, and Bouchaud 1996). The main hypothesis underlying this model is
that market crashes may be understood as a “critical phenomenon” strongly
analogous to critical phase transitions. This hypothesis is made precise by
postulating a correspondence between the quantities that are used to describe
financial crashes and the physical quantities that describe critical phase tran-
sitions. This correspondence then allows one to draw inferences concerning
various quantities of interest, including the probability of a crash occurring
under various circumstances.
In more detail, on the JLS model a stock market crash occurs when the
system transitions between two phases: a phase prior to the crash and a phase
after the crash. This transition point is analogous to the critical point for
physical systems, and in the present context corresponds to the time at which
a stock market crash is most likely to occur. In this model, there are two
quantities that are relevant for capturing this behavior of interest. The first is
known as the hazard rate, h(t). The hazard rate measures the instantaneous
rate of change of the probability of the event occurring at time t, given that
it has not yet occurred by t. The larger the hazard rate, the more rapidly
the probability of an impending crash is increasing, given that the crash has
not yet occurred. 12 It may be thought of as the instantaneous rate at which
crashes should be expected to occur, if only crashes were repeatable. The
second quantity is the price of some asset as a function of time, p(t). These
two quantities determine the dynamic equation that will be used to predict
12More precisely, if F(t) is the cumulative distribution function of a crash occurring at
or before time t, then h(t) = F ′(t)/(1−F (t)), where F ′(t) = dF is the probability density
function. Conversely, one can define a cumulative probability function from a hazard rate
by integrating both sides of this equation with respect to t. See, for instance, Cleves (2004,
Ch. 2) for further details on interpreting hazard rates.
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future crashes and provide a framework for the underlying microfoundational
story.
The model begins with a general form for the price dynamics for a time
prior to a crash. These dynamics are given by:
log
p(t)
p(t0)
= k
∫ t
t0
h(t)dt (4.1)
where is the price at some initial time t0, is the price at a subsequent time t,
is a constant, and is the hazard rate. Note that the hazard rate determines
the price. 13 This means: the higher the hazard rate, the faster the price of
an asset will rise. In other words, the more risky the asset is, the more the
trader expects to receive in the future as compensation for taking on that
risk.
Note that these dynamics are consistent with the standard financial mod-
eling assumptions described above. In particular, in the special case where
the hazard rate vanishes, the expected change in price over any given time
interval vanishes, just as one would expect from the martingale condition dis-
cussed in Section 2 for a stock that does not pay dividends. Following JLS,
we call this the “fundamental regime”. When the hazard rate is positive,
meanwhile – the so-called “bubble regime” – one expects price to increase
exponentially over time. In this regime, the increase in price is driven up by
the accumulated risk involved in holding the asset during a period in which
a crash is deemed possible. Investors are willing to pay ever higher prices on
the grounds that they expect price to continue to increase without bound,
as long as a crash does not occur.
13It is tempting to interpret the right hand side of Eq. 4.1 as representing the probability
of a crash occurring during the period from t0 to t, but this would be incorrect: the
integral of h(t)dt does not yield a probability. (For instance, it may exceed 1.) Instead,
this quantity should be understood as a measure of accumulated risk, in the sense that
it represents the total number of times you should have experienced a crash during this
period, supposing the crash were repeatable. Once again, see Cardy 2004[Ch. 2].
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In this general form, these dynamics do not give an account of stylized
facts such as the power law behavior we observe in financial time series, nor
do they tell us anything about the microscopic mechanism underlying the
occurrence of a crash. It is to get these further results that one introduces
the qualitative analogy to critical phase transitions. (Up to this point, no
such analogy has been invoked.)
To begin, we suppose that markets consist of populations of two types of
traders, which JLS call “rational” and “noise” traders. (It is not essential
that these populations be distinct; particular traders may sometimes be noise
traders and sometimes rational traders.) The rational traders are assumed
to trade on the basis of market fundamentals; noise traders, meanwhile, are
assumed to base their decisions on trends, imitate others around them, etc.
rather than investigating market fundamentals (Kyle (1985)).
The model then assumes that traders are situated in a lattice network,
analogous to the lattice of the Ising model, the most important model in the
study of phase transitions, including the paramagnetic- ferromagnetic tran-
sition mentioned above. (Note, however, that the specific lattice structure
will turn out to be distinct from the Ising model.) Agents in this network
may be in one of two possible states: a “buy” state or a “sell” state, just as
spins in an Ising model may be either “up” or “down” Also like in an Ising
model, agents are assumed to imitate their nearest neighbors, so that if a
given agent is in a different state from the average of her neighbors, there
will be a non-zero probability that the agent will change states. A crash on
this model is understood as a moment in which a large group of traders are
suddenly in the “sell” state.14 Therefore, in this model a crash is caused (at
the microscopic level) by self-reinforcing imitative behavior between traders.
14Sornette (2003) also considers the possibilities of “anti-crashes”, wherein a large num-
ber of traders suddenly transition to “buy” states; these are taken to be the ends of
“anti-bubble” regimes. However, it is important to note that neither Sornette (2003) nor
Johansen (2000) explain the fact that crashes are generally caused by “sell” states instead
of “buy” states.
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This behavior is analogous to a phase transition, during which a large number
of nodes in the Ising model adopt the same state.
In statistical mechanics, the quantity that best describes the tendency of
particles to imitate one another is the susceptibility of the system. In the
ferromagnetic-paramagnetic transition mentioned above, this quantity cor-
responds to the magnetic susceptibility , which is governed by the following
power law near the transition point:
χ ≈ A|T − TC |−γ (4.2)
where A is a positive constant, TC corresponds to the critical temperature,
and is known as the critical exponent. Informally, the susceptibility of the
system characterizes the tendency of the system?s average magnetization
(which is related with the number of spins in the same state) to change due
to the influence of a small external field. One consequence of the power law is
that at the critical point, T = TC , χ diverges. The divergence of the magnetic
susceptibility implies the divergence of the correlation length, a quantity that
measures the average distance over which particles in the system interact. It
is due to the divergence of the correlation length at the critical point that
distant particles are likely to be mostly in the same state at the same time.15
The JLS model posits that the hazard rate has the same general form as
the magnetic susceptibility
h(t) ≈ B|t− tc|−α (4.3)
where tc is the most probable time for the crash, B is a positive constant,
and is a critical exponent that is assumed to have values between zero and
one. Note that attributing this form to the hazard rate is really an ansatz:
15For more details on the logic of critical phenomena in physics, see Wilson and Kogut
(1974), Goldenfeld (1992), Cardy (1996), Fisher (1998), Kadanoff (2000), Sornette (2006),
and Zinn-Justin (2007); for a more philosophical take, see Batterman (2002) and Butter-
field and Bouatta (2015).
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no claim has been made to have derived this power law behavior from any
microscopic model (or family of models). Instead, we have made two in-
dependent assumptions: the first is that traders may be modeled as agents
on a lattice with two states, without specifying any details of the lattice or
interactions between agents; and the second is that the hazard rate has a
particular form analogous to the magnetic susceptibility. The idea that the
hazard rate should be analogous to susceptibility is motivated by the idea
that a crash should correspond to large correlation lengths, but this does not
fix the form of the equation 4.3.
The final ingredient of the model is phenomenological. Observing the
stylized fact that prices exhibit accelerating oscillations in the lead up to a
crash, one infers that the critical exponent α in 4.3 is complex.16 A complex
critical exponent modifies the power law to include periodic oscillations in
time known as log-periodic oscillations.17 JLS argue that, to leading order
in a Fourier expansion near tc, the general solution for h(t) is given by:
16The argument here is subtle. JLS first present their model generically, without making
any assumptions about the details of the network. They then observe that if the network
has certain features – in particular, if it is hierarchical in a sense to be explained in section
4.2 – then it will exhibit complex critical exponents, and hence log-periodic oscillations near
criticality. They give some plausibility argument for considering hierarchical lattices, but
leave the actual lattice structure open until they consider historical data –at which point
they conclude that, given the presence of oscillations, the network must be approximately
hierarchical and the critical exponents must be complex. It is in this sense that introducing
complex critical exponents is “phenomenological”. One can also run the argument in the
other direction, however, and argue that on the basis of a plausible assumption concerning
the hierarchical nature of trader networks, the critical exponents should be expected to
be complex; at times, Sornette and collaborators appear to prefer this version of the
argument.
17An early discussion of log-periodicity and self-similarity is given by Barenblatt and
Zeldovich (1971). Extensive work on the existence of complex critical exponents with log-
periodic oscillations has been carried out by Sornette and his collaborators (eg. Sornette
1998; 2006; Zhou et al. 2005).
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h(t) ≈ B0|tc − t|α
′
+B1|tc − t|−α
′
cos[α′′ log |tc − t|+ φ (4.4)
where B0, B1, and φ are real constants, α
′ is the real part of α, and α′′ is the
imaginary part of α.
Having identified this form for the hazard rate, one then plugs h(t) from
Eq. 4 back into the general dynamic equation 4.1 to obtain an expression
that describes the behavior of price as a function of time given this hazard
rate, to obtain:
log[p(t)] = log[pc]−
k
β
(B0(tc − t)βcos[ω log(tc − t) + φ]) (4.5)
where β = 1− α′ ∈ (0, 1), pc = p(tc) is the price at the critical time, and
φ is another constant.
Eq. 4.5 succeeds in capturing the stylized facts observed in the occurrence
of extreme events, including volatility clustering and accelerating oscillations
(Yalamova and McKelvey 2011). Moreover, as we will elaborate below, it pro-
vides an explanation of these observed phenomena – and indeed, of crashes
themselves – that appeals to the existence of self-reinforcing imitative behav-
ior between traders. Finally, the model aims to be predictive by providing
the tools to anticipate the occurrence of crashes that arise due to endogenous
herding behavior, such as panics, by describing a specific form of accelerating
oscillations – namely log periodic oscillations – that provide a signature of
approaching criticality.
Note that although volatility clustering and accelerating oscillations are
taken as stylized facts that are “inputs” for the model that are used to
establish that the complex exponent in Eq. 4.3 is complex, the specific form
of Eq. 4.5 should be taken as an output of the model. As such, it can be back-
tested to provide empirical support for the model as a whole, and specifically
for the claim that crashes may be understood as critical phenomena. The
results of these tests have been reported in several places (Sornette, Johansen,
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and Bouchaud 1996; Sornette and Johansen 1997; Johansen, Ledoit, and
Sornette 2000; Sornette 2003; v. Bothmer and Meister. 2003; Calvet and
Fisher. 2008). Perhaps most remarkable is the crash of 1987, where the log-
periodic oscillations are visible even to the naked eye (Johansen, Ledoit, and
Sornette 2000).
4.4 The Logic of the JLS model
The JLS model, and the analogy between crashes and critical phenomena on
which it is based, are highly suggestive. However, one needs to be careful
about the limits of the analogy.18 As we will presently argue, even if one
accepts the arguments given in the previous section, the logic of the model is
importantly different from that of models from statistical physics on which it
is based. First, we will argue that unlike critical phase transitions, “critical”
market crashes do not form a universality class in the sense of renormaliza-
tion group (RG) physics. It follows that explanatory strategies familiar from
applications of the RG in physics do not carry over directly to this model.
We will then present a different analysis of the logic of the JLS model, em-
phasizing what sort of explanations we think the model can provide. We will
conclude by observing that although the mathematical methods used in the
JLS model are similar to those from physics the role that these methods play
in application are different.
18There are various criticisms of the JLS model that also stress the disanalogies between
the JLS model of financial crises and critical phase transitions. For example, Ilinski (1999)
casts doubt on a main component of the JLS model: crashes are principally caused by im-
itative dynamics between individual traders. He objects that different market participants
may act over different time horizons (e.g. minutes for speculators, years for managers),
so that the instantaneous long-range interactions between traders postulated by the JLS
model are implausible. We will not engage with this criticism or others; instead, we
want to see how far the analogy goes if we assume that the model is well-motivated and
well-supported empirically.
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4.4.1 Do Market Crashes Constitute a Universality Class?
To evaluate the analogy between market crashes in the JLS model and criti-
cal phenomena in physics, we will begin by describing the situation in physics
in some further detail. As noted above, when a system undergoes a critical
phase transition, some important physical quantities diverge. For instance,
in the ferromagnetic-paramagnetic transition described in section 3, the di-
vergent quantities are the magnetic susceptibility, the specific heat, and the
correlation length. The divergence of the correlation length implies that all
spins are correlated at the transition point regardless of the distance between
them. That is, the measuring distance unit is no longer important. When
this happens, the system is said to be scale invariant.
Scale invariance is consistent with the observation of power law behav-
ior of physical quantities near a critical point. The exponents appearing
in these power laws – called critical exponents – were originally determined
experimentally. Surprisingly, radically different systems, such as fluids and
ferromagnets, were found to have exactly the same values for their critical ex-
ponents. This was particularly striking because the exponents were deemed
anomalous, which is to say that they were not whole numbers or simple frac-
tions. Systems having the same values of their critical exponents are said to
belong to the same universality class.19 One of the great achievements in the
theory of phase transitions was the development of RG methods to explain
how this universal behavior comes about – i.e., to explain why apparently
different systems have the same scaling behavior near criticality.
19As will become clear in what follows, by “universality class” we mean the basin of
attraction of a given non-trivial fixed point under some RG flow. In cases of critical phase
transitions, these correspond to systems with the same critical exponent near the transition
point, though RG methods may be applied more generally. Batterman and Rice (2014)
suggest a still-broader definition of “universality class” that applies to systems outside of
physics where the RG does not apply; as we will see below, market crashes will turn out
to form a universality class in this more general sense, but one needs to be careful about
the role that the RG plays in the argument for this.
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RG methods consist, roughly, in a set of transformations by which one
replaces a set of variables by another set of – generally coarse-grained – vari-
ables without changing the essential physical properties of a system. The (in-
finite) iteration of these transformations in a space of Hamiltonians enables
one to find so-called fixed points of the transformation, which are Hamilto-
nians that represent the (coarse-grained) dynamics of a system near a tran-
sition point.20 This procedure is taken to explain universality, as it has been
shown that systems in the same universality class flow to the same fixed
points, and thus the systems in a given universality class should be expected
to have the same dynamical properties near the transition point. The exis-
tence of non-trivial fixed points is generally taken to show that a system’s
microscopic details are irrelevant to its behavior near criticality. In addition,
RG methods provide an argument for the use of highly idealized models in
the explanation of radically different systems. For instance, by showing that
both ferromagnets and fluids are in the same universality class as the Ising
model, RG methods justify the use of the Ising model for the study of both
systems.
Thus, in physics, the logic of universality arguments goes as follows. One
begins with the empirical observation that certain systems exhibit the same
behavior ? i.e., have the same critical exponents – near criticality. One then
shows that those that systems flow to the same fixed point by iterated appli-
cation of an RG transformation, thus explaining their observed similarity by
establishing that, at a certain level of coarse-graining, these systems have the
same dynamical properties. In other words, the thing one is ultimately trying
to explain is why a range of apparently different systems are all saliently the
same, and the explanation proceeds by showing that the microscopic details
of the systems do not matter to the phenomenon in question.21
20Note that our description of RG methods here follows the “field space” approach, in
the sense of Franklin (2017).
21Note that it is not essential, here, to begin with an empirical observation –though that
is what happened in the physics of phase transitions. In principle, one can demonstrate
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Is the same reasoning applied in the JLS model? Note that if this sort
of argument could be so applied, it would be very attractive. For one, it
would mean that markets could be expected to always have the same log-
periodic behavior, with the same critical exponent, in the lead up to a crash,
which would yield a strong predictor of crashes. Moreover, there are good
reasons to be skeptical about the microscopic details of any market model.
Markets have heterogeneous participants whose behavior will depend on a
large number of endogenous and exogenous factors that no model can hope
to accurately represent. And so, an argument to the effect that, irrespective
of the details of how one models market participants’ disposition, the same
large-scale behavior can be expected would provide both helpful support for
the resulting large-scale model, and also alleviate worries about the particu-
lar microscopic model that has been adopted. It would also justify adopting
highly idealized models of market actors, analogously to how the renormal-
ization group justifies using the Ising model for critical phase transitions.
Unfortunately, however, it would appear that this reasoning cannot be
carried over directly. In particular, the first step does not work. While data-
fitting supports the idea that the relationship between price returns and
hazard can be captured via a power-law (eg. Johansen, Sornette, and Ledoit
1999), analysis of past crashes does not support the hypothesis that crashes
constitute a universality class in the sense of all corresponding to the same
non-trivial fixed point of some RG flow. This is because crashes do not all
exhibit the same critical exponent. Via curve-fitting, Graf v. Bothmer and
Meister (2003) show that in 88 years of Dow-Jones-Data there actually are
no characteristic peaks in the critical exponent β of equation 4.5. Although
JLS showed that the exponent of the crash in 1987 and the crash in 1997
differ by less 5%, Sornette et al. (1996) show that the value of that exponent
differs substantially from other important crashes such as the crash in 1929.
that two systems are in the same universality class and thereby predict their behavior near
critical points.
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The fact that that there is no characteristic peak in the exponent ? has
the following consequence. Stock market crashes are neither in the same
universality class as the Ising model (or any previously solved model) nor do
they constitute a universality class themselves.
One might think, as Sornette and collaborators themselves seem argue to
in at least some places, that the fact that crashes do not constitute a uni-
versality class entirely undermines the analogy between crashes and critical
phenomena.
If we believe that large crashes can be described as critical points
and hence have the same background, then β, ω and δt should
have values which are comparable. (Johansen, Ledoit, and Sor-
nette 2000, p. 17)
As we will argue below, however, we do not think that the failure of
crashes to constitute a universality class is a major problem for the model.
But it does mean that the logic of the model, and the sorts of explanations
we can expect from it, are importantly different from in physics. If we cannot
expect crashes to constitute a universality class, then the RG story cannot be
applied either for the calculation of critical exponents or for the explanation
of the universal behavior observed in crashes (or not observed, as it happens).
In other words, if there is universal behavior in stock market crashes, this
is not the kind of universal behavior that can be explained via RG methods
alone. 22
22Note however that this does not mean that RG methods cannot be applied at all in
the context of the JLS model. Zhou and Sornette (2003), for instance, use renormalization
group methods to obtain an extension of equation (5) that gives an account of larger time
scales. Moreover, as we will see, RG methods will reappear in our analysis below, although
they will play a different role than in statistical physics.
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4.4.2 On the Reductive and Explanatory Character of
the JLS model
We saw above that the JLS model apparently does not work by establishing
that market crashes form a universality class. This means that one cannot
apply the same reasoning as in physics to argue that large-scale market be-
havior near transition points (i.e., crashes) is independent of the microscopic
details of market dynamics. It thus seems that insofar as the JLS model is
successful, it must function differently. In this section we will develop a posi-
tive account of the logic of the JLS model, describing what we take the model
to explain and how. We will argue that the JLS model relies on a subtle inter-
play between microscopic and macroscopic considerations, by which known
mathematical facts familiar from statistical physics are used, in conjunction
with empirical considerations, to draw inferences in both directions.
Recall that, whereas the arguments from statistical physics sketched above
began with a brute empirical claim –many systems appear to have the same
critical exponents – the JLS model began with two separate ingredients. The
first, 4.1, was taken from mainstream economics – or at least, from the the-
ory of rational bubbles. The second, Eq. 4.3, was a bare ansatz, inspired by
statistical physics but in no sense justified by it. In other words, one begins
by considering what market dynamics would look like if the hazard rate were
governed by a power law near crashes, similarly to how the magnetic suscep-
tibility behaves. These two ingredients, along with the further specification
that the exponent in Eq. 4.3 is complex, then lead to Eq. 4.5, concerning
the logarithm of market prices near a crash. It is this equation that is the
principal predictive output of the model, and also the means by which the
model is both calibrated and tested against historical data.
But this is not the whole model. To motivate the ansatz that the hazard
rate satisfies Eq. 4.3 near crashes, JLS include a third ingredient, which is
that microscopic market dynamics may be modeled as a network of agents,
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interacting with their nearest neighbors via imitation, and that the hazard
rate may be interpreted, much like the magnetic susceptibility, as a mea-
sure of the characteristic distance scale of correlations between agents. The
proposal that market participants form some sort of network of influence is
taken as prima facie plausible, and no particular evidence is offered for it;
at this stage, no claims are made about the details of the network structure.
Drawing on known results from statistical physics, JLS then observe that
networks of this sort are very often associated with power laws near critical-
ity for the parameter that is now being interpreted as hazard rate, thereby
linking Eq. 4.3 with a class of microscopic models.
One then argues that insofar as Eq. 4.5 is successful, this relationship
between network models and power laws lends further plausibility to treating
market microdynamics with a network model of this sort, and also that
spontaneous herding, which now is understood to correspond to long-distance
correlations in a network, explains endogenous market crashes. In particular,
the divergence of the hazard rate at the critical point implies the divergence
of the correlation length, i.e. the range of interaction between traders.
As we noted above, if the correlation length in a network model of this sort
diverges, the system becomes scale invariant. It is under these circumstances
that the system is successfully described by power laws. Scale invariance
means that, near the critical point, market dynamics are self-similar across
scales. In other words, as traders imitate their neighbors, they aggregate
into clusters (e.g. companies) that act as individual traders imitating their
neighbor companies, and so on, to higher and higher scales. This imitation
procedure across different scales accounts for how information propagates
so quickly before a crash: “...critical self-similarity is why local imitation
cascades through the scales into global coordination” (p. 32).
But now, recall that the critical exponents in the JLS model were de-
termined to be complex, and that the associated power laws exhibited log-
periodic oscillations. Not all network models lead to log-periodic power laws
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(LPPLs); they typically arise (only) when the underlying network model
exhibits discrete scale invariance. Discrete scale invariance means that the
system is scale invariant only under special discrete magnification factors;
this, in turn, implies that the system and the underlying physical mecha-
nisms have characteristic length scales. As Sornette (1998) points out, this
provides important constraints on the underlying dynamics. In particular,
it suggests that traders are arranged on a hierarchical lattice, which is a
lattice in which, by virtue of the network structure, some nodes (traders)
have greater influence than others (still via nearest-neighbor interaction).
Examples of hierarchical networks such as the Bethe lattice, a fractal tree,
or hierarchical diamond lattice. These hierarchical networks tell us not only
how information propagates through scales but also how information prop-
agates within the same scale. In figure 1, for instance, one can see that in
the Bethe lattice information that starts by one agent propagates within the
same scale faster than exponentially.
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Figure 1: Illustration of a Bethe Lattice, one of the possible network
structures underlying the occurrence of a crash according to the JLS model.
The point in the center of the figure represents a trader who is source of
opinion. The first ring represents the neighbors, who tend to imitate the
opinion of the trader at the center. The second ring represents their neigh-
bors, who are indirectly influenced by the opinion of the first trader, and so
on. This aims to illustrate how imitation could possibly propagate resulting
into global coordination.
Sornette has argued that it is plausible to model the propagation of infor-
mation in social structures using hierarchical lattices, and also that there is
independent empirical support for doing so (Sornette 2003, Ch. 4). But it is
not claimed – nor is it necessary to claim – that under general circumstances,
the network of traders is fractal, or that it corresponds to some exact hierar-
chical lattice. Instead, what is claimed is that under general circumstances,
the network of traders lies in the basin of attraction of a hierarchical model
under RG transformations, so that its critical behavior is the same as that of
a hierarchical network, i.e., so that near a crash markets exhibit LPPLs. In
other words, interactions between traders must be “approximately” hierar-
chical, in the sense of lying in the same universality class as some hierarchical
network (with imitative dynamics). It is here that RG methods enter explic-
itly into the JLS model. One might think of the role played by RG methods
here as establishing that crashes form a universality class in a more general
sense than that discussed above, namely by showing how a wide range of
systems flow to fixed points characterized by hierarchical networks of one
sort or another. (We will return to this idea below.)
We claim that it is the inference from observed LPPLs to discrete scale
invariance of an underlying network structure (or, more generally, from power
laws of any kind to scale invariance) that forms the explanatory core of the
JLS model. In more detail, what we find here is an explanation of (endoge-
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nous) market crashes as arising from the structure of the network of traders
at the time the crash occurs. Markets crash in the absence of any exter-
nal, coordinating event because the network of traders can spontaneously
evolve into states that are (discretely) scale invariant, i.e., which have long
correlation lengths, so that small, essentially arbitrary perturbations, can
propagate rapidly across scales. Perhaps surprisingly given the literature on
universality and explanation, this explanation, as we understand it, is causal,
in the sense of Woodward’s interventionist account of causation (Woodward
2003).23 On Woodward?s account, causes are variables that one could in-
tervene on in order to reliably influence a system. More precisely, one says
that A causes B if (given some background conditions) there is a conditional
of the form “if A, then (likely) B”, where A can be understood as a single
variable that one could, in principle, manipulate. On this account of causa-
tion, a relationship such as the one between LPPLs, discrete scale invariance,
and transitions, which holds across a range of different condition, can serve
as a guide to identifying causal relations. As Woodward puts it, “When a
relationship is invariant under at least some interventions...it is potentially
usable in the sense that...if an intervention on X were to occur, this would be
a way of manipulating or controlling the value of Y” (16). We take it that the
moral of the JLS model in its most general form is as follows: if the network
of agents participating in a market approaches a (discretely) scale-invariant
23Sornette also speaks of this explanation as “causal”: for instance, when he writes “?the
market anticipates the crash in a subtle self-organized and cooperative fashion, hence
releasing precursory “fingerprints” observable in the stock market prices?. we propose
that the underlying cause of the crash must be searched years before it in the progressive
accelerating ascent of the market price, reflecting an increasing build-up of the market
cooperativity” (Sornette 2003 p. 279). As we noted in footnote 8, we do not take the
claim that this explanation is causal to be in conflict with the views defended by Batterman
(2000; 2002), Reutlinger (2014), or others. The claim is not that there is an explanation
of universality in this model that is causal. Rather, the claim is that the explanation of a
given crash, or even crashes in general, is causal, because the JLS model identifies how to
intervene to produce a crash, or to prevent one – namely, by changing network structure.
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state, as signaled by the appearance of LPPLs in price, then (it is likely
that) a crash will occur. In other words, the model says that crashes occur
in many different systems precisely when their (coarse-grained) dynamics be-
come approximately discretely scale invariant. And so, it is the emergence of
discrete scale invariance (or, perhaps, scale invariance more generally) that
should be identified as the proper cause of the crash. On this view, it is the
state of the network as a whole that should be understood as the cause of
the crash. But one might worry that this is not an ?event? or ?variable?
of the sort that one can intervene on. We believe it is. First, observe that
on Woodward?s account, it need not be possible to actually manipulate the
variable; it need only be the case that one could imagine, within the model,
changing just this feature. And indeed, in the present case, one certainly
can change the state of the network so that it is no longer scale invariant
(discretely or otherwise), and in doing so, one ipso facto moves away from
the transition point. This is precisely what is needed. More can be said on
this point, however. As we will explore in the final section of the paper, we
believe there are mechanisms by which an agent – say, a regulatory body –
can in fact intervene on the network structure of market participants in order
to disrupt scale invariance. If this is possible, then the conditional above not
only bears a clear causal interpretation, but in fact has policy implications
regarding how to deal with an impending market crash. Before turning to
this point, however, we will consider how the analysis of both the logic of the
JLS model and its explanatory properties that we have just provided bears
on recent debates concerning explanation and universality in the philosophy
of science literature. 5. Infinite idealizations, universality, and explanation
in the JLS model In the last section, we argued that the JLS model, though
bearing important relationships to models of phase transitions in physics,
relied on an argument that was importantly different, both in the sense of
“universality” at play and in how inferences are drawn about the micro- and
macrodynamics of markets. We also presented a positive account of both the
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logic of the model and the character of the explanation it offers of market
crashes. As we argued, this explanation is best construed as causal, in the
interventionist sense of Woodward (2003).
We made these arguments largely independently of the recent literature
on the character of explanations in statistical physics that make use of the
methods the JLS model borrows. There was good reason for this: our main
contention above was that the logic of the JLS model is different from that
of the models of phase transitions on which it is based. That said, there are
some features of the JLS model that make it salient from the perspective
of recent debates on explanation in philosophy of science. In particular, the
JLS model is arguably a minimal model in the sense of Batterman and Rice
(2014).24 A minimal model, according to Batterman and Rice, is one that
“...is used to explain patterns of macroscopic behavior across systems that are
heterogeneous at small scales” (p. 349). More importantly, minimal models
are “thoroughgoing caricatures of real systems” whose explanatory power
does not depend on their “representational accuracy” (p. 350). Instead, the
key feature of a minimal model is that it allows us to say why many different
systems turn out to be saliently similar, despite their significant differences
at a microscopic level.
The model of critical phase transitions discussed above is a paradigm
example of a minimal model in the Batterman and Rice sense. There, the
24See Lange (2015) for a different critique of Batterman and Rice (2014) than we give
here. Lange argues that Batterman and Rice cannot sustain the distinction they draw
between their account and “common feature” accounts such as Weisberg’s (discussed be-
low). We take it that one can sustain a distinction between different explanatory goals,
one of which might well be to explain why many different systems should be expected
to be saliently similar to some highly idealized model, and we think that Batterman and
Rice do an adequate job of explaining both how that explanatory goal can be met, and
why the strategies for meeting it do not look like they are appealing to common features
of a model and a target system. That said, as we will argue, in some cases a single model,
including the JLS model, can be used to achieve more than one explanatory goal.
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goal is to explain why many different systems have the same behavior near
transition points, and moreover, to show why highly idealized models, such
as the Ising model, capture the essential behavior of all of these different
systems. The RG played an essential role in this story. But Batterman and
Rice are clear that it is not only models that use the RG in this way that
are to count as minimal models: they also describe an example from biology
– the Fisher sex ratio model - and argue that it is a minimal model as well.
The essential feature in both cases is that one has a universality class, in
the general sense of a collection of models that are all similar in some salient
way, and an explanation of why all of the systems in question fall into that
universality class.
We argued above that even though the RG plays a different role in the
JLS model than in models of critical phase transitions, there is still a sense in
which market crashes form a universality class, according to the JLS model.
This universality class does not correspond to the basin of attraction of a
single non-trivial fixed point under iterated applications of an RG transfor-
mation. Instead, it is a collection of systems that are all saliently similar, in
the sense that they exhibit LPPLs.
Still, one can explain why a wide range of systems exhibit this same uni-
versal behavior: they all exhibit discrete scale invariance near their transition
points. Moreover, RG methods play an important role in this argument. Al-
though RG transformations do not take all of the relevant similar systems
to the same non-trivial fixed point, they do take such systems to non-trivial
fixed points with complex critical exponents, and thus LPPLs. So in this
sense, the RG establishes the universality class in the salient (generalized)
sense. Finally, although one cannot show that there is some idealized model
that has the same critical exponent as every market crash –since not all mar-
ket crashes have the same critical exponent! – one can show that there are
highly idealized models, each exhibiting discrete scale invariance near tran-
sition points, that give rise to LPPLs near their transition points. It is on
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these grounds that we take the JLS model to be a minimal model in the
Batterman-Rice sense.
The JLS model also has another feature that, though not part of the
official definition of minimal models, seems characteristic of them (Batterman
2005; 2009): the JLS model relies on an infinite idealization. (This provides
one sense in which the model “caricatures” real markets.) That is, the JLS
model assumes that the network of market participants includes infinitely
many agents. Moreover, this feature is necessary for the model as we have
described it, and it is assumed in all versions of the model we know of in
the literature. The reason it is necessary is that scale invariance, including
discrete scale invariance, means that some property of the model must hold
– i.e., be “invariant” – at all scales, no matter how large. Thus only an
infinite model may be truly scale invariant. Likewise, only an infinite model
can exhibit the sort of infinite correlation lengths that we identify with a
transition point.25
These features of the JLS model, and especially the role that the infinite
idealization plays in establishing scale invariance near the critical point, are
common across applications of the RG methods. And Batterman puts con-
siderable weight on the infinities that arise in models that use these methods:
rather than anomalies to be avoided or removed, they are sources of impor-
tant information.
I’m suggesting that an important lesson from the renormalization
group successes is that we rethink the use of models in physics.
25This is not to say that the model could not be reconfigured as one that is invariant
across some scales, but not under arbitrary scale transformations. In other words, we do
not mean to deny what is sometimes known as “Earman’s principle”, that idealized models
can only be explanatory if one can imagine removing the idealization and still being able
to explain the same phenomenon (Earman 2004; J. Butterfield 2011). But doing so would
require substantial changes in the analysis, and would effectively produce a different model
from the one under consideration. Our interest is in the explanatory role of the infinite
idealization in the present version of the model.
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If we include mathematical features as essential parts of physical
modeling then we will see that blowups or singularities are often
sources of information. (Batterman 2009, p. 11)
It seems that something similar is going on in the JLS model: there,
too, one encounters not only infinite systems, but also divergent quantities –
including both the hazard rate and the correlation length between traders.
And it is these blowups that signal that a crash is impending. This singular
behavior is at the very core of the model.
So it seems that the JLS model has the hallmarks of a minimal model.
But if so, there is a tension between what we say above and Batterman and
Rice’s account of how minimal models explain. In particular, Batterman
and Rice emphasize that the sorts of explanations they consider are non-
causal and non-reductive.26 Moreover, they argue minimal models are not
representational, in the sense that their success does not depend on “some
kind of accurate mirroring, or mapping, or representation relation between
model and target” (351). On our view, however, the JLS model does provide
a causal explanation; moreover, this explanation is arguably both reductive
and representational. We have already seen the sense in which the JLS model
provides a causal explanation: it may be understood to yield a conditional
statement, the antecedent of which is a variable on which one can, in prin-
ciple, intervene. Thus, on an interventionist account of causal explanation,
the model appears to allow us to say that it is (discrete) scale invariance that
causes market crashes – or, to put it in more evocative terms, it is herding at
all scales that causes market crashes. Some readers will balk at this claim:
after all, as just noted, only infinite systems can be truly scale invariant, and
realistic markets are not infinite. So, in what sense could a feature that no
actual market could have cause a behavior that realistic markets exhibit? Or
to put it another way, how could actual market crashes be caused by scale
invariance? The answer, as we see it, is that the JLS model explains crashes
26See also Morrison (2006) for a related point.
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by showing that in some networks, correlation lengths can become long, rel-
ative to the overall size of the network, and that when this happens, crashes
become likely. It is the infinite idealization that allows one to precisely char-
acterize the relationship between long correlation lengths, scale invariance,
and crashes, and it is not clear that one could establish this relationship as
neatly in a finite system as one can in the infinite system. But what the
infinite system is ultimately telling us is something about the causal rela-
tionship between correlations between traders and market-wide crashes. 27
We should emphasize that, although we take this explanation to be causal,
it is only on a particular account of causation (i.e., the Woodward (2003) ac-
count). Of course, there are many other analyses of causation on which this
may well not be a causal explanation (Salmon 1984; Strevens 2008). More
importantly, we do not claim that crashes are being explained, here, by ap-
peal to particular details concerning interactions between individual agents.
In this sense, it is not a “causal-mechanical” or “mechanistic” explanation
(Craver 2006; Kaplan 2011; Kaplan and Craver 2011). Indeed, the model
is not committed to any particular network model at the microscale, just a
class of models that exhibit discrete scale invariance. Sornette puts the point
as follows.
It turns out that there is not a unique cause but several mech-
anisms may lead to DSI. Since DSI is a partial breaking of a
continuous symmetry, this is hardly surprising as there are many
ways to break down a symmetry. We describe the mechanisms
that have been studied and are still under investigation. The list
of mechanisms is by no mean exhaustive and other mechanisms
may exist. (Sornette 1998, p. 247)
27Here there is a relationship both to “Earman’s principle”, as noted in footnote 35, and
also to Butterfield (2011), who argues that in cases where one takes an unrealistic infinite
limit, one should expect to see the qualitative behavior that arises in the limit appearing
already on the way to the limit.
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Thus, the model does not even include a specific account of how agents
interact with one another. It is rather a generic feature of a range of possible
networks that plays the causal role.
This last point is also closely related to the senses in which we take
the JLS model to be reductive and representational. The antecedent of the
conditional described above refers to the micro-constituents of the market.
It is in this sense that we take the explanation to be reductive. But it does
not follow that the model supposes an atomistic conception of the economy,
i.e. it does not determine the law governing the behavior of any arbitrary
agent. But, given some behavioral assumptions, it does constrain the kinds
of structures they might reside in. In this case: hierarchical structures that
(sometimes) exhibit discrete scale invariance. This does not require any
particular arrangement of individuals because those particular details are in
some sense irrelevant; what does matter are these structural details.
Likewise, the model is representational in the sense that its success de-
pends on the fact that it represents certain stylized facts about market par-
ticipants: they influence one another, at least sometimes, by imitation, and
their interactions are hierarchical, in the sense that some traders are able
to influence larger groups than other traders. Of course, this is far from a
complete or accurate representation of market participants. But if actual
market participants do not bear relations to one another that are adequately
represented by a network with these features – or if markets are not dis-
cretely invariant across at least some scales – then the JLS model would fail
to support the causal explanation we have described here. And so, it seems
that the success of the explanation does depend on the representational ac-
curacy of the model, at least with regard to these particular features. This
weak sense of being “representational” indicates that the JLS model may
(also) be understood as an example of what Weisberg (2007) calls “minimal-
ist models”: “[A] minimalist model contains only those factors that make
a difference to the occurrence and essential character of the phenomenon in
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question” (Weisberg 2007, p. 642). It also invokes Strevens’ (2008) account
of idealized models: “the content of an idealized model, then, can be divided
into two parts. The first part contains the difference- makers for the explana-
tory target... The second part is all idealization; its overt claims are false but
its role is to point to parts of the actual world that do not make a difference
to the explanatory target” (318). Strevens, too, argues that this sort of ide-
alization is compatible with causal explanation. Of course, Batterman and
Rice’s minimal models and Weisberg’s minimalist models are supposed to be
fundamentally different; worse, those philosophers who have mistaken mini-
mal models for minimalist models have “almost universally misunderstood”
the explanatory structure of these models (Batterman and Rice 2014, 349).
And yet, it would seem that the JLS model is an example of both. How could
this be? The tension can be resolved if one distinguishes between, on the one
hand, features of a model – what sorts of idealizations it involves; in what
senses, if any, it is representational; what sorts of mathematical relationships
and methods it relies on – from the sorts of explanations one can give by
appealing to the model, i.e., the why questions one is able to answer (citealt-
Vanfraassen1980). 28 Batterman and Rice define minimal models as models
used to give certain sorts of explanations involving universality classes. Since
the JLS model can be used to explain why market crashes form a universality
class (in the broad sense), the JLS model counts as a minimal model. These
explanations, they argue, are neither causal nor reductive, and their success
does not depend on the accuracy with which the models represent target
systems; using the JLS model to explain the universal behaviors associated
with crashes (namely, LPPLs, discrete scale invariance, etc.) is presumably
also non-causal, at least insofar as Batterman and Rice’s arguments are con-
28This point mirrors one made by O’Connor and Weatherall (2016): there are many
different purposes for which models may be constructed, and to which they may be put.
This includes different explanatory purposes, and so one should be cautious about attempts
to classify or taxonomize models on the basis of how they may be used to explain.
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vincing. 29 But the fact that the JLS model can be used for this sort of
explanation does not bear on whether one can also use it to provide other
explanations; nor does it bear on which explanations seem most salient in the
context in which the JLS model was developed. In other words, we claim that
the JLS model may be used to answer the question, ‘Why do markets gener-
ically exhibit volatility clustering, log-periodic oscillations, etc. near market
crashes, even though market conditions otherwise vary dramatically?” To do
so, one uses RG methods to show that a large variety of different networks
exhibit discrete scale invariance and satisfy LPPLs near transitions points.
In answering this question, we give the sort of explanation that Batterman
and Rice are pointing to, and it is for this reason that the JLS model is a
minimal model. But we claim that we can also use the JLS model to answer
the question, “Why do stock markets crash?”, where this question is under-
stood to be about the causes of crashes. And in this case, the answer is:
because hierarchical networks can spontaneously evolve into states featuring
discrete scale invariance, and scale invariance of any sort allows vanishingly
small perturbations to cascade across scales.30 It is in answering this question
that the Woodwardian conditional described above is crucially invoked. And
it is in answering this question that the minimalist representational features
of the JLS model matter. There are several points to emphasize here. The
29We tend to think that they are convincing, or at least, we agree that explanations of
universality of the sort Batterman and Rice discuss are non-causal. (See also Reutlinger
2014 for a different argument concerning why these explanations are non-causal.)
30Note that there is another interpretation of “Why do stock markets crash?” that
does not demand a causal explanation, but rather another minimal model explanation:
namely, “Why do markets fall into a universality class of systems that exhibit crashes,
as opposed to tamer sorts of transitions?” Of course, this is a legitimate explanatory
demand, and the answer, invoking the JLS model, would look more like the answer to
the first question than the second. The difference between these two understandings of
the question “Why do stock market crash?” invokes van Fraassen’s (1980) analysis of the
logic of why questions. Explanatory demands, van Fraassen convincingly argues, involve,
in addition to the explinandum, both a contrast class and a relevance relation.
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first is just to clarify our argument, lest our claims above be misconstrued:
As should now be clear, when we argued above that the JLS model pro-
vides a causal explanation, we did not mean to imply that the explanation
one can give for why market crashes form a universality class is a causal
explanation (contra Batterman and Rice), nor (ipso facto) that all explana-
tions are causal.31 The point is rather that the JLS model, despite having
the characteristic features of a minimal model, may nonetheless be used to
give causal explanations (in addition to minimal model explanations). And
pulling apart these different explanatory tasks requires careful attention to
precisely what question one is trying to answer. A second point to emphasize
is that, even though the why questions described above are distinct, there
is a subtle interplay between them. It is precisely because the JLS model
can be used to explain why market crashes form a universality class in the
relevant sense that it can (also) be used to provide a certain kind of causal
explanation of market crashes, since it is the relationship picked out by this
universality class, between discrete scale invariance and LPPLs near tran-
sition points, that makes true the conditional that forms the basis of the
causal explanation. More, for precisely the same reason, the infinite idealiza-
tion in the JLS model is essential precisely because it helps one identify the
common mechanism underlying the phenomenon of interest ? and thus, it is
the infinite idealization that permits the causal explanation. Conversely, it
is precisely because the relationship encoded by the Woodwardian condition
holds that market crashes fall in a universality class (in the broad sense) in
the first place.
This situation raises a question. If the JLS model can be both a minimal
model and also a minimalist model, can we understand the other models that
Batterman and Rice discuss, including models of critical phase transitions,
as also providing interventionist causal explanations (in addition to minimal
31For other examples of explanations that seem to be even more clearly non-causal, see
Weatherall (2011; 2017).
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model explanations)? In a sense, the answer must be “yes”, at least if what
we argue above is correct. For instance, in the phase transition case, one
can use the Ising model to answer the question, “Why do critical phase
transitions occur?”, construed causally, by showing that the Ising model,
and a wide range of other models in its universality class, can evolve into
states that are (approximately) scale invariant, and thus vanishingly small
perturbations can cascade across scales. This explanation is causal in just
the same sense that the corresponding explanation invoking the JLS model
is. Once again, there is a subtle interplay between this explanation and the
minimal model explanation using the same model, since the fact that real
systems are in the same universality class as the Ising model is precisely
what isolates scale invariance as the difference-maker (or, perhaps better,
the manipulable variable).
All that said, there is still a difference between the JLS model and critical
phase transitions in this regard. It concerns which explanatory demands
seem most salient. As we noted above, one of the most striking features of
critical phase transitions is the fact that many different systems have the
same critical exponents. The salient issue is not to explain why transitions
occur at all, but rather to explain why transitions in different systems are so
similar. Of course, this does not prohibit one from asking the other question;
it is just a matter of emphasis. (Besides, background theory, such as mean
field theory, seems to explain this well, without explaining universality.) In
the case of financial markets, the situation seems to be reversed: there, one
wants to explain why (endogenous) market crashes occur at all, particularly
given that crashes are often taken to be in tension with the EMH and other
standard market modeling assumptions. And for this reason, it is the causal
explanation using the JLS model that seems to be the salient one.
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4.5 Policy Implications
We argued above, particularly in section 4.2, that the sense in which we
take the JLS model to provide a causal explanation is interventionist: it
depends on identifying a potential conditional relationship, the antecedent
of which can be understood as a variable that can be manipulated, at least
in principle. Moreover, the JLS model provides an observable signal of when
that antecedent obtains. But having identified such a variable means that
we have also identified a potential target for policy intervention. If we accept
the JLS model, how might a regulatory agency intervene to prevent crashes?
The answer is to disrupt the network structure on which traders reside.
How might one do this? One possibility would be through structural
changes. Hierarchical networks have interesting dynamical properties be-
cause their inhabitants tend to cluster together and thus disseminate risk in
particular ways.
...hierarchical networks are resilient to peripheral crises, but very
fragile in the face of crises in the center. In these systems, the
risk of contagion falls as the system integrates around the center.
(Oatley, Winecoff, Pennock, and Danzman 2013, p. 135)
Thus, one possible intervention would be to try to identify regions of the
network that are peripheral, and try to introduce further connections – i.e.,
increase integration –between them, as this can make hierarchical networks
more resilient to contagion.
It is not clear that this sort of proposal could serve as a response to an
impending crash, however. Another proposal that might be more effective
in this regard is given by Petter, Kim, Yoon, and Han. (2002). They borrow
from computer science to suggest that sometimes the performance of a system
can be improved by selectively deleting vertices and edges in a network (i.e.
the relationships between nodes/agents):
107
If one wants to protect the network by guarding or by a tempo-
rary isolation of some vertices (edges), the most important ver-
tices (edges), breaking of which makes the whole network mal-
functioning, should be identified. (1)
Here the suggestion would be to identify, in advance, particular rela-
tionships – say, relationships between major banks, or within banks – and
intervene on them when LPPLs appear in market data, perhaps by blocking
information from being exchanged between particular actors.
The JLS model can also be used as a diagnostic tool for evaluating current
regulatory tools. For instance, one type of intervention that is actually used
as a financial regulatory tool is the “trading curb”. A trading curb works by
temporarily halting activity if a very large, sudden drop occurs in the stock
market. For instance, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) currently has
in place several “circuit breakers”, which kick in depending on how much the
Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) has moved within a short period of
time, with longer time-out periods for larger sudden drops.
[T]he circuit-breaker halt for a Level 1 (7%) or Level 2 (13%)
decline occurring after 9:30 a.m. Eastern and up to and includ-
ing 3:25 p.m. Eastern, or in the case of an early scheduled close,
12:25 p.m. Eastern, would result in a trading halt in all stocks
for 15 minutes. If the market declined by 20%, triggering a Level
3 circuit-breaker, at any time, trading would be halted for the re-
mainder of the day. (“NYSE: NYSE Trading Information” 2016)
Circuit breakers may also be assigned to a particular stock, rather than
to the market as a whole. For instance, “limit up, limit down” measures
employed in some markets prevent a stock from being traded outside a certain
price band for a few minutes (Pisani 2013). For instance, a 5 % movement
within five minutes (e.g. say a stock drops to $5 at that time) would mean
that for 15 minutes, it would not be allowed to trade for less than $5.
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One motivation behind trading curbs is that in the period during the
halt, investors will “calm down,” i.e. behave more rationally rather than
contributing further to a bubble of irrational exuberance (or pessimism).
Unfortunately, some studies indicate that curbs can actually encourage such
behavior, especially if agents know what the trading curbs are and whether
the relevant limits are being approached (Goldstein and Kavajecz. 2004).
The JLS model provides some insight into why this might be. In particular,
if stock markets crash because of long-range correlations between traders,
then a trading curb merely slows down trading, without disrupting the un-
derlying network state that causes the crash. Worse, the trading curb itself
can serve as a coordinating signal to the entire network that the market is
in a precarious state, in a way that actually increases correlations.
4.6 Conclusion
In the foregoing, we have argued that the JLS model provides a compelling
causal explanation of market crashes, with potential predictive power. The
model is consistent with mainstream models in financial economics, but
clearly goes beyond them – and does so by exploiting an analogy with physics.
As noted in the introduction, we take this as a proof of concept: econophysics
at least has the capacity to contribute to our understanding of economic
phenomena, even while remaining within the general realm of mainstream
economic thought.
We have also used the JLS model to explore how idealized models that
use the physics of phase transitions may be used to provide a reductive expla-
nation. We argue that the JLS model may be understood as both a minimal
model and a minimalist model, and that the apparent tension between these
accounts dissolves once one recognizes the different explanatory demands
that a single model may be used to answer. The JLS model offers a causal
explanation of why markets crash: namely, they crash because markets can
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evolve into states that are approximately discretely scale invariant, with long
correlation lengths, such that small perturbations can have outsized effects.
But this is not the only explanation one can give using the JLS model; one
can also explain why crashes generically exhibit certain features, such as
volatility clustering, by showing that crashes lie in a universality class, in
the generalized sense described in the paper. That the same model may be
used to offer two different explanations – one causal, and one, presumably,
non-causal –points to the importance of separating questions concerning the
explanatory purposes to which a model can be put from attempts to classify
or characterize models themselves.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Prospectus
Before summing up the main points of this dissertation, I would like to
mention some problems associated with phase transitions that remain open
in the philosophical literature and that I could not address here.
5.1.1 Universal Explanations
Critical phase transitions are a well-established case of universal behavior,
in which one can demonstrate that systems as diverse as fluids and magnets
have exactly the same critical exponents, which means that they instantiate
the same macrobehavior. The existence of universal behavior is the result of
the insensitivity of critical exponents to short scale effects, which is demon-
strated using renormalisation group techniques. An important discussion in
philosophy in the last years regards the kind of explanation that renormaliza-
tion group approaches provide. Many (Batterman 2000, Reutlinger (2014)
and Lange 2015) agree that renormalization group explanations are scientific
examples of non-causal explanations. However, they disagree with respect
to why RG explanations are non-causal. For some (Batterman 2000, Bat-
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terman and Rice 2014), renormalization group explanations are non-causal
because they ignore causal details. For others (Reutlinger 2013, 2015 and
Lange 2015), they are non-causal explanations because their explanatory
power is due to the application of mathematical operations, which do not
serve the purpose of representing causal relations. Questions that deserve
to be addressed in future research are: what are the core aspects involved
in renormalization group approaches that make them constitute non-causal
explanations? Are all explanations involving renormalization group methods
non-causal or does this depend on the question that we are asking?
5.1.2 Quantum Phase Transitons
All what has been said in this dissertation concerns classical phase transi-
tions, but important questions arise when we consider quantum phase tran-
sitions. Landsman (2012) argues, for instance, that quantum phase transi-
tions impose more philosophical challenges than classical phase transitions.
It would be interesting to investigate to what extent the solutions to the
problems that we have offered here also apply to quantum phase transitions.
Another interesting question would be whether a quantum foundation
of thermodynamics can give us different insights on the problems that arise
when we consider classical phase transitions. In particular, D. . Wallace
(2014), 2015 argues that quantum mechanics is in a better position than
classical statistical mechanics to explain many of the foundational problems
that arise in the context of thermodynamics. A question that remains to
be addressed is whether quantum mechanics can actually solve problems
surrounding phase transitions better than classical statistical mechanics.
5.1.3 Finite Theories of Phase Transitions
Very recently, physicists have suggested alternative microscopic explanations
of phase transitions that do not invoke the thermodynamic limit. At least
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two approaches are especially relevant for the questions that have been ad-
dressed in this dissertation: (i) the proposal that relates phase transitions
with microcanonical singularities (e.g. Franzosi, Pettini, and Spinelli 2007)
and (ii) the proposal that relates these processes with the topology of con-
figuration space (Casetti and Kastner 2006). The importance of these new
programs lies in the fact that they can be applied to finite systems. Given
that the main problem of reducing phase transitions regards the assump-
tion of the thermodynamic limit, the question that arises quite naturally is
to what extent these new proposals provide a decisive argument in favor of
the reduction of phase transitions. Philosophers taking an antireductionist
position have not addressed this question yet. Similarly, the literature de-
fending the reduction of phase transitions has generally overlooked these new
approaches.
5.1.4 Defining Equilibrium for Symmetry-breaking Phase
Transitions
An interesting issue that has been addressed recently concerns the differ-
ences in Boltzmann and Gibbsian’s approaches to give an account for the
phenomenon of spontaneous magnetization (ferromagnetic phase transition).
Werndl and Frigg (2018) point out that whereas in the Gibbsian framework
of statistical mechanics there can be no spontaneous magnetization (because
the magnetization is zero for any arbitrary value of the temperature and any
arbitrary value of N), in the Boltzmannian framework, for any arbitrary N,
the magnetization will be non zero at a certain temperature, which means
that using Boltzmannian framework will allow us to define spontaneous mag-
netization also for finite N . The latter rises many interesting questions. The
first, which is addressed by Werndl and Frigg 2017, is whether this means
that Gibbsian and Boltzmannian frameworks lead to different empirical re-
sults. The second, that remains to be addressed, is whether this implies that
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Botzmannian approach offers a more suitable framework to account for phase
transitions that involve symmetry-breaking than the Gibssian approach. Fur-
thermore, whether this is related with the the property of ergodicity-breaking
that is associated with symmetry-breaking phase transitions.
5.1.5 Analogue Experiments
During the past years, physicists have tried to gain insight into domains of
nature that are beyond experimental reach by testing the hypotheses at stake
in systems that are analogous to, but not identical with, the target system.
For instance, in order to study properties of black holes, which are empir-
ically inaccessible, they have recently performed experiments in analogue
systems, such as fluids, which have the methodological advantage of being
manipulable in the laboratory. The philosophical question that arises then
is: what does justify the confirmatory power of such indirect experimental
procedures? A common justification that is found in the literature hinges
on the notion of universality, according to which the target and analogue
systems, despite their differences, instantiate the same macroscopic behav-
ior (Unruh and Schützhold 2005, Dardashti, Hartmann, and Thebault 2015,
Dardashti, Thebault, and Winsberg 2015. However, how to demonstrate the
relevant universal behavior in this context remains an outstanding problem.
Questions that deserve to be addressed in future research are: How can we
demonstrate the existence of universal behavior, for example in the case of
black holes? Is the notion of universality present in the case of black holes
the same as the one that characterizes critical phase transitions? How can
we compare the strength of different notions of universality? And in what
sense this a affects the confirmatory power of analogous experiments?
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5.2 Summing up
An important lesson from what has been discussed here is that, when we con-
sider the case of phase transitions, the concept of emergence must be taken
with a grain of salt. Although it is true that there are good reasons to believe
that phase transitions are “emergent” in some sense, this does not necessarily
imply that phase transitions undermine important notions of reduction that
have been at stake in the philosophical literature. In particular, in Chapter
2, I have argued that the physics of classical phase transitions are not ad
odds with a notion of inter-theory reduction that compares the values of the
relevant quantities in two different theories. This notion of reduction may ap-
pear weak to some philosophers, but it is enough to justify the success of the
thermodynamics of phase transitions and to establish a connection between
thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. More importantly, it allows us
to build a connection between the macroscopic behavior of phase transitions
that we observe everyday with the cooperative behavior of interacting lower
level entities.
Another claim that it was made here was that the justification of infinite
limits is primarily an empirical task that can be achieved if it can be shown
that the limit is controllable. Although in Chapter 2 and 3, I have defended
the view that we are justified in using the thermodynamic limit in the theory
of phase transitions, this does not imply that we have the same justification
for the use other limits in statistical mechanics. As it was shown in Chapter
3, the infinite-time limit is particularly hard to justify, because generally one
does not have control over how fast this limit approaches the experimental
values. It would valuable to continue investigating the role of the infinite-time
limit and the possibility of offering an empirical justification for it.
Finally, in Chapter 4 I have argued that the physics of phase transi-
tions could actually help us provide reductive explanations for stock market
crashes. It would be worth investigating whether similar interpretations can
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be given to other models that use physics to explain cooperative behavior
in social sciences such as models for vehicular traffic (e.g. Chowdhury et al.
2000) and Galam models for the process of workers’ strike in big companies
(Galam et al 1982) .
As we saw, the topic of phase transitions raises many foundational ques-
tions that are of interest for both physicists and philosophers. Fortunately,
in the last years philosophers have begun paying attention to some of these
issues, but it is clear that more work needs to be done in the future.
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